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Abstract. We develop an ecological open-economy SFC model that enables testing cross-area
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governments of less ecologically efficient areas to move further away from low-carbon assets. We
argue that ‘green’ monetary and fiscal policies can be used to tackle climate change and financial
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currency fluctuations can bring about unintended consequences, undermining green policies’ effects.
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1. Introduction
Financial stability is paramount for promoting low-carbon transition. In order to achieve Paris
Agreement’s goals, low-carbon or ‘green’ investments are required worldwide (e.g. UNFCCC
2015). According to International Energy Agency (IEA), the current level of low -carbon
investment is inadequate. In fact, additional 48 trillion USD are estimated to be necessary over
the period 2020-2035 (IEA 2011). Besides, 3.5 trillion USD investment per year in the energy
sector would be necessary up to 2050 (IEA, 2017). This means that the current level of green
investment should be nearly doubled. In addition, appropriate policies to allocate private and
public funds are required to boost green investment growth and trigger synergies among
sectors and institutions. Several policies, mechanisms and incentives are to be implemented
for promoting low-carbon assets and to share investment risks between private and public
actors. For instance, some programmes have been undertaken to align the financial system
with climate goals (UNEP, 2014). These strategies and other climate policies are expected to
affect private investors’ behaviour in the next decades (e.g. Ameli, et al. 2017; Boissinot et al.
2016). The importance of low-carbon-oriented finance to achieve long-term sustainable
growth has been recognised by world-leading institution, including the High-Level Expert
Group on Sustainable Finance (European Commission 2016). However, the volume of
scientific studies on the effect of green finance and low-carbon investment on climate change
is still limited – as reported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report (IPCC
2018). Current understanding and opinions about how to channel more capitals towards green
investment are also incomplete and quite contentious (e.g. Gupta et al. 2014).
In the attempt to contribute to this debate, we developed an ecological open-economy stockflow consistent (SFC) model. The model enables us to test cross-area interactions among
productive sectors, financial markets and the ecosystem. We aim at identifying possible
transmission channels of climate risk, that is, the impact of global warming on the real
economy, financial institutions and financial instruments. We also assess potential
implications of policies aiming at alleviating the expected impact of climate change on
economic variables, while mitigating climate-related financial risks. More precisely, we show
that the unequal technical progress across areas, coupled with rising ecological awareness,
can force governments of less ecologically-efficient areas to reduce cross-border transactions
and move further away from green technologies. Monetary and fiscal policies can help counter
these tendencies. Unlike most climate finance authors, we highlight the stabilising role of fiscal
policies, as a complement of monetary policy. In line with Deleidi and Mazzucato (2018) and
Deleidi et al. (2019), we posit that mission-oriented government spending is fundamental in
defining the level of private green capital accumulation. We also consider the impact of
selective credit rationing favouring green investment plans over conventional investment (e.g.
Dafermos et al. 2018). However, possible side effects, linked with the impact of cross-border
financial flows and output growth rate differentials on exchange rates, must be carefully
considered and addressed. Looking at the theoretical foundations, our contribution builds
upon the most recent literature on ecological macroeconomics and climate finance. While
there are several methodological affinities, we depart from the existing literature in that we
focus on cross-border (or cross-area) effects and interactions. We do so by using a model in
which the world economy is likened to two interacting autonomous open systems. We use a
brand-new method of determination of the exchange rate. This is a crucial variable, as it
transmits the impulses from financial (and real) international transactions to the domestic
economy and the broad ecosystem.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we provide a short review of most
recent literature on ecological macroeconomics modelling and climate finance. In section 3,
we present the most relevant theoretical and methodological aspects of our contribution. We
discuss the key features of our ecological open-economy model. We then use the model to
analyse the impact of selected global warming-related shocks on key economic, financial and
ecological variables. Our tentative findings are presented and discussed in section 4. We
argue that, without a cross-area policy coordination plan, international financial flows, output
growth rate differentials and the related exchange rate adjustments are likely to bring about
unintended consequences, undermining green policies’ effectiveness. Additional remarks are
made in section 5.

2. Literature review
An increasing number of (either aggregative or microfounded) ecological and climate finance
models have been developed in the last decade. These models aim at:
a) Detecting sustainable growth conditions and questioning the growth imperative (e.g.
Jackson and Victor 2015 and Richters and Siemoneit 2017);
b) Studying the energy sector (e.g. Naqvi 2015, Berg et al. 2015);
c) Investigating the trajectories of key environmental, macroeconomic and financial
variables (e.g. Dafermos et al. 2017, 2018);
d) Analysing the impact of green fiscal policies and ‘green sovereign bonds’ (e.g.
Monasterolo and Raberto 2018; Bovari et al. 2018);
e) Examining the interaction between climate change and financial stability (e.g.
Dafermos et al. 2018);
f) Assessing the impact of State-led innovation policies on climate change and other
ecological variables (e.g. Mazzucato 2015; Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018; Deleidi et
al. 2019);
g) Addressing the questions of how to finance the transaction towards a ‘greener’
economy (e.g. Campiglio 2016; Ameli et al. 2017; Rademaekers et al. 2017) and how
to tackle climate risks (e.g. Aglietta and Espagne 2016; Bardoscia et al. 2017; Battiston
et al. 2017; Bovari et al. 2018; Dafermos et al. 2018).
More precisely, Jackson and Victor (2015) raise the question whether growth is necessary for
capitalist economies to survive. In other words, they check whether a ‘growth imperative’
exists, which is determined by the need for the borrowers to pay back the interests due on the
stock of outstanding debt. For this purpose, they use a SFC dynamic macro-economic model
accounting for the credit creation process led by banks and private equity in a closed economy.
They find no evidence of a ‘growth imperative’. In addition, they show how an economy can
move from a growth to a stationary (or nongrowing) path. They argue that the countercyclical
spending carried out by governments can promote such a transition by smoothing and
dampening the oscillations associated with it.
Similarly, Richters and Siemoneit (2017) analyse several SFC post-Keynesian models and
question the idea of positive interest rates as the main responsible for the ‘growth imperative’.
Particularly, a stationary state economy – characterised by zero net saving and investment –
is compatible with positive interest rates. The paper confirms the idea of a debt-based
monetary system that does not cause any growth imperative. A stationary state is generated
by positive net saving and net investment decisions, which are permanently above zero, and
not by a systemic and inevitable necessity.
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Naqvic (2015) proposes a multi-sectoral SFC model for a closed economy. Production is
demand-led and the economy is made up of several institutional sectors (firms, energy,
households, government, and financial institutions), which interplay with the environment. The
model is calibrated on the European economy and aims at evaluating the effect of five
alternative environmental economic policies (i.e. a de-growth scenario, a capital stock damage
function, a carbon tax, a higher share of low-emissions renewable energy, and an investment
in technical innovation) on three main challenges (trilemma): (i) boosting output growth; (ii)
fostering employment growth with a more equal distribution; or (iii) improving environmental
sustainability. The study is motivated by a trilemma that European policy makers are currently
facing. Naqvic’s findings show that four out of five policies cannot solve the three challenges
simultaneously. Only the investment in innovative technologies can increase output, foster
employment (and wage growth), while reduce CO2 emissions.
A multi-sectoral ecological SFC model is also employed by Berg et al. (2015), who integrate
the stock-flow analysis with the input-output methodology. This allows to model to detect the
interaction among three types of flow variables: (i) monetary flows in the financial system; (ii)
flows of goods and services produced by the real economy; and (iii) the flow of physical
materials related to the natural environment. These models are more flexible than standard
aggregate SFC models, for they allow modelling a variety of sectors. The model developed by
Berg et al. (2015) considers an economy made up of five sectors: the government sector, the
banking system, the household sectors, and two industrial sectors that produce energy and
goods. The main findings of the paper can be summarised as follows: (i) a nongrowing
economy can be associated with positive interest rates; (ii) an increase in energy prices can
negatively affect the economic system by lowering real wages and aggregate demand, thus
triggering a recession. Overall, the model shows hot to integrate heat emissions due to
economic activities and climate change modelling.
Dafermos et al. (2017) develop a stock-flow-fund ecological macroeconomic model
calibrated on global data, which combines a standard SFC framework with the flow-fund
approach developed by Georgescu-Roegen. The authors assume that output is demand-led
and finance is non-neutral. This allows considering the channels through which the monetary
system, the real economy and the ecosystem interact. Supply constraints are determined by
the exhaustion of natural resources and by environmental damages. Climate change is
included in the analysis and affects aggregate demand through the influence of catastrophes,
global warming, and health issues on the desired level of investment, savings, consumption
and potential output. The analysis focuses on two types of green finance policy: (i) a reduction
in interest rates and the relaxing of credit rationing criteria on green loans; (ii) a reduction in
interest rates and the relaxing of credit rationing criteria on green loans, combined with tighter
conditions on conventional types of loans. The second policy generates better environmental
results than the first one, because of the lower economic growth rate. More precisely, it is
associated with a lower output level combined with a larger share of green investment, lower
CO2 emissions and lower atmospheric temperature. Finally, the leverage ratio of firms is lower
under the second scenario, despite the lower economic growth rate. This is because damages
due to global warming reduce as the share of green loans increases.
In a more recent paper, Dafermos et al. (2018) assess and investigate the existing links
between climate change and financial (in)stability. By using a stock-flow-fund macro model,
the authors argue that an increase in the average temperature can be detrimental for firms’
profitability and financial stability, possibly leading to a higher default rate and increasing the
risk of systemic bank losses. The authors focus on the physical risks implied by climate
change. They maintain that ‘climate-induced financial instability reinforces the adverse effects
4

of climate change on economic activity’ (Dafermos et al., 2018, p. 220). In addition, they
consider the impact of global worming on households’ portfolio choices. The latter tend to be
diverted towards ‘safer’ and more liquid assets (because of the impact on economic agents’
confidence), such as deposits and government bonds, causing in this way a decrease in
corporate bonds’ prices. To tackle the financial instability triggered by climate change, a green
quantitative easing program, regarded as a long-term industrial policy, is proposed and
discussed. The authors analyse a hypothetical scenario where central banks decide to buy a
quarter of total green bonds worldwide. The policy’s effectiveness is shown to vary according
to the parameters of the model. More precisely, a crucial role is played by the sensitivity of
investment in green capital assets to the differential between green bonds’ and conventional
bonds’ yields. However, green QE policies usually help counter financial instability. Investment
financing turns out to be less dependent on bank credit, and hence less subject to credit crunch
risks. Moreover, slower climate change implies a reduced degree of economic damages. As
a consequence, firms’ profitability is restored, liquidity problems are dampened, and the
default ratio decreases.
The model developed by Deleidi et al. (2018) is based on four different theoretical
approaches: (i) the Sraffian supermultiplier model; (ii) the Neo-Schumpeterian framework
which emphasises the entrepreneurial role of the State; (iii) the SFC approach to macroeconomic modelling; (iv) and recent developments in ecological economics literature aiming
at cross-breeding post-Keynesian theories with more traditional ecological framework. The
paper aims at developing a simple analytical tool that can help examine: (i) the impact of
innovation on economic growth and the ecosystem; and (ii) the impact of ecological feedbacks
on economic growth and government spending effectiveness. The authors find that, in
principle, government can be successful in supporting innovation and growth while slowing
down natural reserves’ depletion rates and tackling climate change. This requires targeting
green innovations policies characterised by the highest ecological efficiency gains. More
precisely, the State can actively promote green innovation, thus driving a change in the overall
economic structure. However, ecological feedbacks affect government policy effectiveness. In
addition, it is argued that the policy-makers are likely to be facing a conundrum in the next
decade: green innovation allows for lower matter-, energy- and CO2-intensity coefficients, but
the higher investment and production levels may well frustrate these efficiency gains.
Bovari et al. (2018) combine a SFC approach with a dynamic predator-prey of (LotkaVolterra) model. They analyze the challenges posed by climate change in conjunction with
private indebtedness. The starting point of the analysis is as follows: climate-change mitigation
is an expensive process and, given the multiple constraints imposed on public finances, the
private sector is expected to carry out most of the burden. However, this can lead to a further
explosion of private debt and trigger financial instability. The latter is co-caused by global
warming and private indebtedness. The proposed policy approach consists in pricing carbon
emissions through a carbon tax, which should incentivize firms to devote part of their
production to the abatement of emissions. The authors conclude that, in spite of the +2° C
target being plausibly already out of reach, an adequate carbon tax can be conducive to a
reduction in carbon emissions and to the achievement of the +2.5°C objective. This result can
be obtained without affecting economic growth, as long as adequate policies aiming at
increasing the wage share and fostering the employment rate are also set in motion.
Monasterolo and Raberto (2018) propose a mix of fiscal and monetary policies (green
sovereign bonds) that aim at tackling climate change. The analytical tool used to conduct the
analysis is the so-called EIRIN model. The latter is a SFC model with neo-Schumpeterian
insights, where the supply side is defined through a Leontief production function. In addition,
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the economy is made up of ‘heterogeneous economic sectors and subsectors characterized
by adaptive behaviours and expectations (households, firms), heterogeneous capital goods
characterized by different resource intensity, a credit sector characterized by endogenous
money creation, and a foreign sector’ (Monasterolo and Raberto, 2018, p. 229). The
simulations show that green sovereign bonds significantly contribute to green investment and
help reducing the import of raw materials. However, the implementation of this monetary policy
can imply a short-run trade-off between positive effects in terms of green transition and the
risk of wealth concentration. Focusing on green fiscal policies, incentives and taxes, climate
change mitigation can come at the cost of negative feedbacks on the economy (for instance,
in terms of an increase in the unemployment rate).
Finally, Campiglio (2016) analyses how the banking system and macroprudential policies
can support low-carbon investments through selective funding. Other authors (e.g. Ameli et
al. 2017, and Rademaekers et al. 2017) focus on the role played by different classes of
investors, notably, institutional investors, pension funds and insurance companies. The effects
of ‘transition’ and ‘physical’ risks (due to climate change) on the stability of the financial system
are considered, among others, by Aglietta and Espagne (2016), Bardoscia et al. (2017),
Battiston et al. (2017), Bovari et al. (2018) and Dafermos et al. (2018). Overall, it is argued
that climate change is likely to have severe implications for the stability of the financial system
in the next decades, by increasing bankruptcy rates, leading to ‘flight to safety’ behaviours,
and worsening credit conditions. The impact of a variety of monetary policies (e.g. green QE
programmes and selective credit) is analysed. There is a general agreement that green
monetary policies can smooth climate-induced financial instability, although they can only slow
down global warming.

3. Theory and method
3.1 Model features and key assumptions
Our work innovates relative to the existing literature in that it focuses on (side) effects of
international or cross-border financial flows. The formal tool we developed and used belongs
to the class of stock-flow consistent (SFC) dynamic macroeconomic models. Unlike financial
instability, ecological aspects were not initially covered by Godley and Lavoie (2007a) and
early SFC works (e.g. Caverzasi and Godin 2015; Nikiforos and Zezza 2017). Arguably,
ecological SFC models represent one of the most significant internal developments in that
literature (e.g. Carnevali et al. 2019). While some ecological and climate finance SFC models
have been developed in the last decade, they usually focus on a single-country or single-area
economy. However, local impacts of climate change and natural resources’ depletion are likely
to be unequal across countries. Besides, when climate risk-related financial shocks hit an
area, this can bring about indirect effects for other countries or areas – because of the
interconnections of the balances of payments and the stock markets. To shed light on this yetunexplored aspect, we developed an ecological open-economy or two-area SFC model. The
model is an advanced version of the simple prototype presented by Carnevali et al. (2019). Its
basic structure is made up of 225 equations and two redundant equilibrium conditions.
Exogenous variables and parameters are 132. The full set of identities, equilibrium conditions
and behavioural equations is displayed in the Appendix, while coefficient values are displayed
by Table 5.
The key features of our model can be summarised as follows:
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a) We divide the world economy in two main areas, named Greenland and Brownland,
respectively.
b) Each domestic household sector is made up of two social groups or classes: the
recipients of labour incomes (the workers) and the recipients of entrepreneurial and
financial incomes (the capitalists).
c) While the workers can only hold their savings in form of cash (domestic currency) and
bank deposits, capitalists can diversify their portfolios by purchasing domestic and
foreign government bills and/or firms’ shares (see Fig. 1, charts g and h).
d) Initial values of economic and financial stocks, and the related parameter values, are
identical across areas (e.g. GDPs, wealth stocks, propensities to consume, return
rates, etc.).
e) Both economies are demand-led in the short- and long-run. There is no constrain on
the supply side, except for the availability of natural reserves and the impact of global
warming. All variables are expressed at constant prices.
f) Productive firms can undertake both conventional investment and low-carbon or green
investment. The latter can be supported (or not) by the government sector.
g) Current accounts are balanced in the baseline scenario, while government budgets
are not (both government sectors record a small deficit indeed).
h) There is a floating exchange rate regime. As a result, it is the ebb and flow of the
market that determine the relative price of the currencies. We will argue that financial
flows play an essential role (along with cross-area output growth rate differentials).
i) Natural resources endowments (matter and energy) are identical across areas. Each
area can only access its own reserves. However, ecological policies of each area can
affect the other area both via the balance of payment channel and through changes in
the average temperature (due to industrial CO2 emissions).
j) Unlike economic and financial coefficients, techniques of production are different:
compared to Brownland, Greenland is marked by lower CO2-, energy- and matterintensity coefficients, and a higher share of renewable energy to total energy (see
Table 5).
In formal terms, assumptions (a) to (j) result in eighteen blocks of equations (see Appendix).
The first block – equations (1) to (16) – defines disposable income and net wealth of
households in each area. This is quite standard in SFC literature, except for equations (3)-(5)
and (10)-(12), which account for the revaluation of foreign currency-denominated financial
assets generated by changes in the exchange rate.1 The second block – equations (17) to
(38) – defines domestic consumption levels and income shares. Notice that equations (30)
and (37) determine the cross-border net flows of profits (dividends) between the two areas.
The third block – equations (39) to (60) – defines investment plans of firms and capital
accumulation. Equations (45) to (48) are the most important in defining private investment
dynamics of the first area considered. Taken together, equations (45) and (46) hold that
productive firms invest as long as their current stock of capital is below a target level, defined
as a percentage of output. The speed of adjustment is inversely related to credit rationing
factors, meaning inversely related to the interest rate on loans and firms’ leverage ratios, and
positively related to banks’ liquidity ratios and the share of green investment to total investment
– see equations (221) and (223). Equation (47) defines private green investment as a share
of output plus two additional components depending on government green spending and the
Capital gains due to changes in the market values of shares are implicitly considered, as portfolio equations
determine nominal demanded (and supplied) stocks of shares, inclusive of price revaluation effects.
1
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interest rate on (green) loans, respectively. In line with Deleidi and Mazzucato (2018) and
Deleidi et al. (2019), we posit that mission-oriented government spending is crucial in defining
the level of private green capital accumulation. 2 The latter improves the ecological efficiency
of the productive system (lower matter-, energy and CO2-intensity ratios and higher recycling
rate). It is implicitly assumed that, first, the firms choose the amount of optimal investment;
second, they set the share of it to be devoted to green investment; third, they calculate the
amount of conventional investment as a residual level. This is the meaning of equation (48).
Identical considerations go for equations (56) to (59), which are referred to the other area. The
fourth block define imports and exports for the two areas. The fifth block – equations (65) to
(82) – defines households’ portfolio equations. Six types of financial instruments are
considered: cash, bank deposits, domestic government bills, foreign bills, shares issued by
domestic firms and foreign shares. Workers can only hold cash and deposits, while capitalists
are also allowed to hold domestic and foreign bills and/or shares. Capitalists’ portfolio choices
are made based on standard Tobinesque principles. Bank deposits are the residual asset.
The sixth block – equations (83) to (98) – shows that government bills’ supplies adjust
smoothly to nominal demand, while, in the stock market, prices are determined in such a way
to match nominal demands with supplies (based on investment plans). The seventh block –
equations (99) to (114) – defines the banking sector in a quite conventional way: in each area,
commercial banks grant loans to domestic firms and ‘collect’ deposits from households. They
can also purchase government bills and borrow from central banks (advances). Bank profit is
simply the amount of interests perceived on their asset holdings (loans and government bills),
as the interest rate accruing on the liabilities (deposits and central bank’s advances) is null.
The eight block – equations (115) to (124) – shows that central banks act as lenders of last
resorts for both commercial banks and governments. In fact, this is the way cash is created
and inputted into the system.3 Each government sector can undertake two different types of
spending: green spending and conventional spending. Like the latter, the former does not
influence ecological efficiency directly. However, unlike the latter, it triggers a green innovation
cascade, as it supports private green investment. The ninth block defines the exchange rate.
More precisely, equations (125) and (126) show that a floating exchange rate is used, which
can be simply thought as the relative price of the two currencies. In other words, the exchange
rate is determined by demand and supply forces, considering both the real side (the trade
balance) and the financial side (financial incomes in the current account and the financial
account).4 Blocks ten to fourteen – equations (127) to (190) – are devoted to the ecosystem
and its interactions with the financial and productive sectors. The way we model these
relationships resembles the method proposed by Dafermos et al. (2017, 2018; see also
Carnevali et al. 2019, and Deleidi et al. 2019). The main points are as follows. The tenth and
eleventh block track the evolution over time of matter and energy reserves, where recycling
and renewable sources of energy are also considered. The twelfth block defines the change
in global atmospheric temperature as a simple function of CO2 emissions in the two areas.
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In fact, the second and third components of equation (47) can be regarded as defining the share of
green investment that private firms would not be undertaking if they were not supported by the State or
by privileged credit conditions, respectively.
3
We assume that commercial banks hold no idle balances of high-power money (reserves) at the
central bank.
4
Notice that perfect capital mobility is assumed, but capital substitutability is not. In other words,
economic agents make their portfolio choices based on relative return rates on assets. However,
differences in return rates are persistent, because assets are not perfect substitutes. There is no return
rate equalisation tendency.
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The thirteenth block defines ecological efficiency in an endogenous way. More precisely,
matter-, energy- and CO2-intensity coefficients of each area are determined by the share of
green capital to total capital stock. Similarly, national renewable energy shares grow as the
shares of green capital stock grow. Besides, block fourteen holds that both working-class
households’ propensities to consume (out of income) and capital depreciation rates depend
on climate change. The reason is that extreme weather conditions, catastrophes and
uncertainty can undermine the pace of capital accumulation. In addition, uncertainty and rising
ecological awareness can affect consumption and/or incentive hoarding behaviours. The last
four blocks – equation (191) to (225) – contain auxiliary equations, which are used to define
domestic and foreign balances, inequality indices within areas, additional financial indices,
and credit rationing variables, respectively.

3.2 Calibration and experiments
Economic parameters of each area are taken from standard SFC modelling literature or
calibrated to obtain a ‘real world’ baseline. The ecological part of the model is based on
Dafermos et al. (2017, 2018) and IPCC (2018), instead.5 More precisely, model coefficients
are set in such a way to obtain a gross world output equal to 80 trillion ca of currency units
(say, USD) in the baseline scenario. World output grows steadily up until 2020 and then
stabilises. Under the baseline, total financial assets (liabilities) are roughly 1.3 times the gross
world output (i.e. more than 100 trillion of USD) in 2020.6 As a result, the baseline output of a
single block roughly amounts to the combined GDPs of the two biggest economic areas
worldwide, namely, the United States and the European Union. Likewise, the other block can
be likened to the rest of the world’s economy.7 In line with IPCC report, worldwide annual
industrial CO2 emissions are 46 billion Gt ca in 2020 baseline (from 15 billion GT ca in the late
1960s). They are expected to drop to 15 billion Gt per year in 2060. Cumulative emissions are
2,100 billion Gt ca in 2020 (from 700 billion Gt ca in the late 1960s), and are expected to
stabilise at 3,100 Gt ca in 2060. As a result, the average atmospheric temperature in 2020 is
+1.5C above its level in the 1950s, and is expected to be +2C in 2060 (or > 2.5C ca in the
‘business as usual’ scenario). Matter resources are calculated in such a way to match 390,000
Gt ca in 2015, while matter reserves are 6,000 Gt ca in the same year. Energy resources are
540,000 Ej ca, whereas energy reserves are 39,000 Ej ca. The socio-economic stock for the
world economy is 1,140 Gt ca in the baseline. Fig. 1 displays baseline values and trends for
selected variables.
[FIGURE 1]
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See Table 5 for the full set of coefficient values, initial values of stocks and lagged endogenous
variables. The balance sheet and the transactions-flow matrix for the two areas are displayed by Table
1 and Table 2, respectively. The physical stock-flow and the flow matrices are displayed by Table 3 and
Table 4. We are happy to provide our model’s program file upon request.
6
Arguably, this value is lower than the actual amount of financial assets, which is estimated to be
around 160 trillion USD worldwide (i.e. twice size world output).
7
Since the purpose of our paper is theoretical, no specific geographic meaning should be attributed to
Greenland and Brownland. In fact, our labels only define different techniques of production.
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Baseline values were obtained by running the model from 1952 to 2020, and then up to 2150,
on an annual basis. We used the model to test the reaction of selected economic, financial
and ecological variables to the following events or shocks linked with global warming:8
1. Preference for ‘safer’ financial assets. Higher risk aversion and hoarding behaviours
can result from the increase in the frequency of natural catastrophes. We test the effect
of investors’ flight to safety.
2. Preference for ‘greener’ financial assets. This can be the effect of a higher ecological
awareness of the population. We test the effect of investors reducing their holdings of
Brownland’s assets, while increasing Greenland’s.
3. Preference for ‘greener’ products. A higher ecological awareness can lead consumers
to turn to low-impact products, ‘zero kilometre’ food, etc. We test the effect of the
decision of both Greenland’s and Brownland’s households to reduce their consumption
of goods made in Brownland, while increasing Greenland’s.
4. Brownland’s austerity (and autarchy) measures. Green policies – e.g. green incentives
– lead Brownland’s private sector to import ‘greener’ products and intermediate goods
from Greenland. This affects Brownland’s trade balance and therefore the government
budget balance. Hence the decision of Brownland policy-makers to address the twin
deficit by cutting green incentives. We test the effect of this policy option.
5. Selective credit rationing. A way to boost green investment is to reduce interest rate
on loans used for low-carbon production and investment purposes. We test the effect
of it in Brownland.
6. Increase of green government spending. Another, more direct, way to boost lowcarbon investment is to support it through active fiscal policies, aiming at generating a
green innovation cascade. We test the effect of these policies on both Greenland and
Brownland.

4. Results and discussion
We used our model to analyse the effects of the above ‘possible worlds’, treated as shocks to
exogenous variables and/or parameter values (see Table 5). We focused on implications for
economic activity, financial stability and the ecosystem. Overall, it is shown that, when crossborder effects are considered, many unexpected and unintended results show up. The main
reason is that international financial flows and output growth rate differentials modify the
relative price of currencies (i.e. the exchange rate), thereby affecting the real economy and
the ecosystem, hence the financial sector.
Preference for ‘safer’ assets (Fig. 2). The decision of investors to move from risky to safer
financial assets is one of the most frequently reported effects of uncertainty. It is usually
associated with the higher frequency of adverse meteorological conditions. The resulting flight
to safety may bring about unexpected or unintended implications though.
[FIGURE 2]
For instance, both Greenland’s and Brownland’s households (capitalists, in our model) may
want to reduce the portion of shares held in their portfolios. They can replace firms’ shares
with liquidity and/or government bills. Whatever the specific mix chosen, output (GDP) benefits
from that change if the portion of idle balances (including both cash and deposits) reduces,

8

Shocks are all run in 2025.
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despite the lower amount of equity. By contrast, output is negatively affected if the overall
portion of liquidity increases. This is the case displayed by Fig. 2a. The point is that financial
assets are not perfect substitutes. Consequently, nonlinear effects are possible when
economic agents redefine their portfolios. Fig. 2j and 2k shows that, in the case considered,
the percentage of cash increases, along with the portion of domestic bills. The portions of
shares and foreign bills fall, and so does the portion of banks deposits (which are replaced
with ‘more’ cash). Notice that the lower output does not necessarily harm government budget.
In fact, it can bring about an improvement of it if central banks act as lenders of last resort –
Fig. 2b. The reason is that a higher portion of bills are now held by the central banks, whose
profits (i.e. seigniorage incomes, which are transferred to the government sector) can offset
the fall in tax revenues. In addition, the lower absolute level of asset holdings (including bills)
held by households help reducing the interest burden for the government. If households’
behaviour is symmetrical across areas, balance of payments’ entries are not affected, neither
is the exchange rate – Fig. 2b, 2i and 2l. This is one of the few cases where international
financial flows play no role. Looking at the ecosystem, a lower output entails lower CO2
emissions and thus a lower average temperature relative to the baseline – Fig. 2c, 2d and 2e.
However, the financial sector does not benefit from it. Fig. 2f and 2g show that firms’ leverage
ratios are now higher and their valuation ratios (as expressed by Tobin’s q) lower compared
to baseline values. Similarly, banks’ liquidity ratios are worse off in the new scenario, because
bank deposits fall more rapidly than loans – Fig. 2h. In short, a flight to safety can improve
ecological indices, but affects private sector’s financial condition. The net impact on the
government sector depends on the role played by central banks, instead.
Preference for ‘greener’ assets (Fig. 3). Climate change can induce investors of both areas
to reduce their holdings of Brownland’s financial assets (including both shares and bills), while
increasing Greenland’s – Fig. 3j and 3k. Our experiments show that Greenland’s economy
does not necessarily benefit from that.
[FIGURE 3]
The adjustment in the exchange rate is the key variable here. Under a floating regime, the
higher flows of capitals from Brownland to Greenland result in an appreciation of Greenland’s
currency – see Fig. 3b and 3i. Greenland’s current account (which is nothing but the opposite
of Brownland’s current account displayed by Fig. 3b) worsens, because of the fall in net export
coupled with the fall in net incomes (dividends and interest payments) – Fig. 3b and 3l. This
affects Greenland’s GDP – Fig. 3a. The increase in Brownland’s output almost offsets the
reduction in Greenland’s output. Unfortunately, this goes along with higher CO 2 emissions,
due to the lower ecological efficiency of Brownland’s firms, and thus higher temperature in the
short to medium run – Fig. 3c, 3d and 3e. Looking at the domestic financial side, Brownland’s
firms increase their leverage ratio, while Greenland’s firms are forced to deleverage – Fig. 3f
and 3g. This is reflected in banks’ liquidity ratios – Fig. 3h. In short, under a floating exchange
rate regime, a higher preference for green financial assets can harm, rather than safeguard,
the ecosystem, while boosting financial imbalances. Notice that Greenland GDP would be
virtually unaffected by capital in-flows under a fixed exchange rate regime. The reason is that
its financial account surplus would result in the accumulation of international reserves, not in
the appreciation of Greenland currency. 9
9

See Fig. 3b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime, where central banks
stabilise exchange rates by accumulating or reducing gold reserves (or the ‘anchor currency’). All in all,
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Preference for ‘greener’ products (Fig. 4). Arguably, the impact of consumers reducing their
demand for “made in Brownland” (and/or increasing their demand for “made in Greenland”) is
far more intuitive.
[FIGURE 4]
Both Greenland’s economy and the ecosystem benefit from greener consumption habits
worldwide – Fig. 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 4e. The aggregate liquidity ratio of Greenland’s banks
worsens, but this is due to their higher lending activity. The leverage ratio of Greenland’s
productive sector is also higher, but the increase in firms’ valuation ratio outstrips the former
– Fig. 4g and 4h. Looking at their portfolios, households now hold more liquid assets, because
of the increase in money demand for transaction and precautionary motives – Fig. 4j and 4k.
It is worth stressing that Brownland’s economy is expected to recover in the medium to long
run, despite the initial negative impact. For the strong depreciation of Brownland currency
ends up boosting its net export and net incomes (dividends and interest payments) from
Greenland – Fig. 4a, 4b, 4i and 4l. However, Brownland records a twin deficit in the short run
when consumers turn to green products.10
Brownland’s austerity (and autarchy) measures (Fig. 5). For Brownland’s policy makers, a
possible way to counter the twin deficit is to pursue a contractionary fiscal policy. This
intervention is more effective when targets green incentives and other types of green
spending, as most green consumer- and intermediate-goods are made in Greenland. 11
[FIGURE 5]
It is no surprise that austerity measures in Brownland are associated with a fall in Brownland’s
output. Fig. 5a shows that Greenland’s economy is also affected, because of the reduction its
export to Brownland. Focusing on rebalancing effects, austerity is effective. Both government
budget and current account balance of Brownland benefit from government cuts – Fig. 5b.
However, as Fig. 5i and 5l shows, the appreciation of the currency ends up undermining
Brownland products’ competiveness, thereby depressing further the economy. The lower
world output entails lower CO2 emissions and thus a lower average temperature, relative to
the baseline – Fig. 5c, 5d and 5e. Looking at the financial side, all indices show a worsening
for both firms and banks based in Brownland. Households also reduce sharply their assets
holdings. These trends can be interpreted as the beginning of a financial crisis triggered by
the economic recession – Fig. 5f, 5g, 5h, 5j and 5k.12 Austerity cures the disease, but kills the
patient.
Selective credit rationing (Fig. 6). Instead of pursuing (green) austerity measures,
Brownland’s policy-makers can try to boost green investment. For instance, they can lower
the interest rate on green loans (that is, loans funding low-carbon investment plans).
[FIGURE 6]

the importance of exchange rate adjustments can be appreciated by looking at Fig. 8, where the market
value of Greenland currency (i.e. Brownland exchange rate) under all considered scenarios is plotted.
10
See Fig. 4b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime.
11
The link between Brownland’s green government spending and the propensity to import is captured
by equation (225) in our model.
12
See Fig. 5b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime.
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In our model, selective credit rationing is effective because of a four-fold relationship: first,
firms adjust their investment to reach the optimal capital to output ratio; second, green
investment grows as interest rate reduces; third, interest rate reduces, and the speed of capital
adjustment increases, as the share of green investment to total investment grows; fourth,
conventional investment is a residual variable.13 As a result, there is a cumulative causation
linking low interest rates and high green investments. If banks incentive green investment
(either voluntarily or by law) there is a beneficial, though temporary, effect on Brownland’s
output – Fig. 6a. However, both the government budget and the current account balance
deteriorate in the short run (thus possibly exacerbating, rather than smoothing, greener
consumption side-effects). Significantly, Brownland’ economy ends up paying an increasing
amount of dividends and interests to Greenland’s investors, which can be unsustainable in the
medium run – Fig. 6b, 6i and 6l. The impact on industrial emissions and climate change is
ambiguous, depending on the scale of ecological efficiency gains. Fig. 6c, 6d and 6e show
that CO2 emissions are initially higher relative to the baseline, because output increase is too
rapid. The worsening of real economy conditions can affect firms’ financial indices in the long
run, while banks are more exposed in the short run, due to the reduction in their profit margin.
No major side-effect for Greenland is recorded instead.
Increase of green government spending (Fig. 7). Arguably, the most effective policy in our
artificial economy is Greenland government policies aiming at supporting green investment.
This policy can generate a green innovation cascade (see Deleidi and Mazzucato 2018,
Deleidi et al. 2019) that boosts private activity, while offsetting (or smoothing) its impact on
climate change.
[FIGURE 7]
Fig. 7a shows that Brownland’s economy takes advantage from Greenland’s policy too. The
effect is only temporary though. For it is progressively counterbalanced by the appreciation of
Brownland currency. This, in turn, is due to the higher deficit (or lower surplus) recorded by
Greenland’s current account balance (because of the fall in net export) – Fig. 7b, 7i and 7l. In
addition, Fig. 7c and 7e remind us that the reduction in CO2 emissions is anything but obvious.
Despite the higher share of low-carbon investments and green innovation, economic growth
may well outstrip any efficiency gain – Fig. 7d. Looking at the financial side, balance sheets of
both banks and firms are quite sound in Greenland. Paradoxically, Brownland households’
wealth is gradually eroded by the appreciation of their currency, which affects income and
hence saving. Brownland’s banks are also affected – see Fig. 7f, 7g, 7h, 7j and 7k.14 The only
way to take full advantage from government green-oriented spending, while limiting its
possible side effects, is for the two areas to pursue green expansionary policies in a
simultaneous way.

5. Conclusions
We have developed an ecological open-economy SFC model that enables testing cross-area
and cross-sector effects on productive sectors, financial markets and the ecosystem. We have
argued that an unequal technical progress across areas, coupled with rising ecological
awareness of investors and consumers, can force governments of less ecologically-efficient
areas to reduce international trade and move further away from low-carbon assets. This
13
14

See equations (45)-(48), (56)-(59) and (221)-(224).
See Fig. 7b displaying the same shock under a fixed exchange rate regime.
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paradoxical effect goes along with possible financial instability and higher industrial emissions
per unit of output. Our main findings can be summarised as follows:
a) The search for safe financial assets (brought about by climate-related uncertainty) can
worsen, rather than improve, financial stability.
b) The search for green financial assets can boost, rather than smooth, climate change.
c) Green consumption can affect domestic and external financial balances of less
ecologically-efficient areas.
d) If governments of less-ecologically efficient areas react by cutting (green) spending,
this is likely to affect both output and financial stability.
e) Selective credit rationing, aiming at supporting low-carbon investment, may improve
ecological efficiency and support economic growth. However, it can also affect current
account and government balances in the short run
f) Selective (or green) innovation-oriented government policy is effective in supporting
growth, while smoothing the impact of anthropic activities on climate. However, it is
likely to entail side-effects for the other area.
To conclude, the most important lesson we can learn from our experiments is that the
effectiveness of green policies depends crucially on the impact of cross-border financial flows
(and output growth rate differentials) on the exchange rates. On the one hand, currency
fluctuations bring about unintended consequences, which can undermine beneficial effects of
low-carbon transition on the environment and on financial stability. On the other hand, a fixed
exchange regime requires strong coordination to cope with possible external imbalances.
Consequently, some form of monetary and/or macroeconomic cooperation and coordination
between areas seems paramount to assure a financially- and ecologically-sustainable growth
path.
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Tables and charts
Table 1. Balance-sheet of the two-area economy
GREENLAND (𝐺)
Households
(capitalists +
workers)
Money (cash)

Firms

−𝐴𝐺𝑑
+𝑀ℎ𝐺
−𝐿𝐺𝑓
+𝐵𝑑𝐺𝐺

B gov. bills
G firms’ shares

+𝑝𝑒𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝑑𝐺𝐺

B firms’ shares

⋅

(capitalists +
workers)

−𝐻𝑠𝐺

+𝐻ℎ𝐵
+𝑀ℎ𝐵
−𝐿𝐵𝑓

−𝐵𝑠𝐺

𝐺𝐺
+𝐵𝑐𝑏

∙ 𝑥𝑟𝐺

Central bank

Σ

−𝐻𝑠𝐵

0

+𝐴𝐵𝑑

0

−𝑀𝑠𝐵

0

+𝐿𝐵𝑠

0
0

+𝐵𝑑𝐵𝐵

+𝐵𝑏𝐵

−𝐵𝑠𝐵

𝐵𝐵
+𝐵𝑐𝑏

0

+𝑝𝑒𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝑑𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺

−𝑝𝑒𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝑠𝐺𝐺

+𝑝𝑒𝐵

⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵

⋅

𝑒𝑑𝐵𝐵

0
−𝑝𝑒𝐵

⋅

𝑒𝑠𝐵𝐵

Conv. capital

𝐵
+𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛

Green capital

𝐺
+𝐾𝑔𝑟

𝐵
+𝐾𝑔𝑟

Σ

Government

+𝐵𝑑𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺

𝐺
+𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛

Balance (net worth)

Commercial
banks

−𝐴𝐵𝑑

⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵

𝑒𝑑𝐺𝐵

Firms

+𝐴𝐺𝑑

+𝐿𝐺𝑠
+𝐵𝑏𝐺

+𝐵𝑑𝐺𝐵
+𝑝𝑒𝐵

Central bank

−𝑀𝑠𝐺

Loans
G gov. bills

Households
Government

+𝐻ℎ𝐺

CB advances
Deposits

Commercial
banks

BROWNLAND (𝐵)

0
𝐺
+𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐵
⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 + 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟 + 𝐾 𝐵
+𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝐺
𝑔𝑟

−𝑉ℎ𝐺

−𝑁𝑊𝑓𝐺

0

−𝑁𝑊𝑔𝐺

0

−𝑉ℎ𝐵

−𝑁𝑊𝑓𝐵

0

−𝑁𝑊𝑔𝐵

0

−(𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝐾𝑔𝑟 )

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Notes: A ‘+’ before a magnitude denotes an asset, whereas ‘–’ denotes a liability (except for Balance’s entries, where signs are reversed). Floating exchange rates are assumed. Capitalists and
workers are aggregated and consolidated in the household sector.
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Table 2. Transactions-flow matrix of the two-area economy
GREENLAND (𝐺)
Households

Consumption

(capitalists +
workers)

Firms

– 𝐶𝐺

+𝐶𝐺

Commercial
banks

Conv. investment

𝐺
+𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛

Green investment

𝐺
𝐺
+𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
[−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
]

BROWNLAND (𝐵)
Households
Government

Central bank

(capitalists +
workers)

Firms

– 𝐶𝐵

+𝐶𝐵

Commercial
banks

Central bank

Σ
0

𝐵
+𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐺 ]
[−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛

Government

𝐵
[−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
]

0

𝐵
𝐵
+𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
[−𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
]

0

Conv. gov. spend.

𝐺
+𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐺
−𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐵
+𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐵
−𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛

0

Green gov. spend.

𝐺
+𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟

𝐺
−𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟

𝐵
+𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟

𝐵
−𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟

0

+𝑋𝐺

G exports to B

−𝐼𝑀𝐺

B exports to G
Wages

+𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌

Taxes

– 𝑇𝐺

𝐺

−𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌

Interests on loans

Interests on B bills

+𝜔𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌
+𝑇𝐺

𝐺
−𝑟𝑙,−1

⋅

𝐿𝐺𝑓,−1

𝐺𝐺
+𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1

G firms’ dividends
B firms’ dividends

+𝐹𝑑𝐺𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵

Managers’ compens.

+𝐹𝑚𝐺

Banks’ profit (distrib.)

+𝐹𝑏𝐺

𝐺
+𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1

Δ in loans

𝐺𝐺
+𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1

⋅

𝐿𝐵𝑓,−1

– 𝐹𝑓𝐺

+𝐹𝑑𝐵𝐺

−𝐹𝑚𝐺

+𝐹𝑚𝐵
– 𝐹𝑏𝐺

−Δ𝐻ℎ𝐺
−Δ𝑀ℎ𝐺

𝐵
+𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1

−Δ𝐴𝐺𝑠
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𝐵
−𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1

0

0

[+𝐹𝑢𝐵 ]

0

−𝐹𝑚𝐵

0
– 𝐹𝑏𝐵

0
𝐵
+𝐹𝑐𝑏

−Δ𝐻ℎ𝐵
∙ 𝑥𝑟𝐺

𝐵𝐵
+𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1

– 𝐹𝑑𝐵

+Δ𝐴𝐵𝑑
−Δ𝑀ℎ𝐵
+Δ𝐿𝐵𝑓

−Δ𝐿𝐺𝑠

0

0

𝐺
−𝐹𝑐𝑏

+Δ𝑀𝑠𝐺
+Δ𝐿𝐺𝑓

⋅ 𝐿𝐵𝑠,−1

0

+𝐹𝑏𝐵
+Δ𝐻𝑠𝐺

+Δ𝐴𝐺𝑑

0
𝐵
+𝑟𝑙,−1

⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺

+𝐹𝑑𝐵𝐵

𝐺
+𝐹𝑐𝑏

0

𝐵𝐺
+𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1
⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺
𝐵𝐵
+𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1

Δ in CB advances
Δ in deposits

𝐵
−𝑟𝑙,−1
𝐺
−𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1

0
+𝑇𝐵

𝐺
+𝑟𝑙,−1
⋅ 𝐿𝐺𝑠,−1

CB profits
Δ in cash

−𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌

0
𝐵

– 𝐷𝐴𝐵 [+𝐴𝐹𝐵 ]

∙ 𝑥𝑟𝐺

[+𝐹𝑢𝐺 ]

Retained profits

𝐵

– 𝑇𝐵

𝐺𝐵
+𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑑,−1
⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵

+𝐹𝑑𝐺𝐺

0

−𝐼𝑀𝐵
𝐺

– 𝐷𝐴𝐺 [+𝐴𝐹𝐺 ]

Deprec. allowances

Interests on G bills

+𝑋𝐵

𝐵
−𝐹𝑐𝑏

0

+Δ𝐻𝑠𝐵

0

−Δ𝐴𝐵𝑠

0

+Δ𝑀𝑠𝐵

0

−Δ𝐿𝐵𝑠

0

Δ in G bills

−Δ𝐵𝑑𝐺𝐺

Δ in B bills

−Δ𝐵𝑑𝐺𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵
0

Σ
Memo: capital gains

−𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐺

−

−Δ𝐵𝑏𝐺

𝐺𝐺
−Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏

−Δ𝐵𝑑𝐵𝐺 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺

0

−Δ𝐵𝑑𝐵𝐵
0

𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐺

+Δ𝐵𝑠𝐺

𝐺
+𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐺

0

0

0

0

𝐺
+𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐺

−𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐵

−

0
𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐵

𝐵
+𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐵

−Δ𝐵𝑏𝐵

+Δ𝐵𝑠𝐵

𝐵𝐵
−Δ𝐵𝑐𝑏

0

0

0

0

0

𝐵
+𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐵

Notes: A ‘+’ before a magnitude denotes a receipt or a source of funds, whereas ‘–’ denotes a payment or a use of funds. Floating exchange rates are assumed. Capitalists and workers are
aggregated and consolidated in the household sector. [ ⋅ ] = capital account entry. 𝐴𝐹 = amortisation funds (which are not explicitly modelled, as they are assumed to equal depreciation allowances).
Subscript ‘𝑒𝐺’ marks capital gains accruing on all shares issued by Greenland firms, regardless of the nationality of investors (similar considerations go for ‘𝑏𝐺’, ‘𝑒𝐵’ and ‘𝐵𝑏’).
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Table 3. Physical stock-flow matrix of the two-area economy (consolidated)
Worldwide
material balance

Worldwide
energy balance

Inputs
Extracted matter

+𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 + 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵
+𝑒𝑟𝐺 + 𝑒𝑟𝐵

Renewable energy
Non-renewable energy
Oxygen

+𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐺 + 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐵
+𝑂2𝐺

+𝑒𝑛𝐺 + 𝑒𝑛𝐵

+ 𝑂2𝐵

Outputs
Industrial CO2 emissions
Waste

−𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 − 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵
−𝑤𝑎𝐺 − 𝑤𝑎𝐵
−𝑒𝑑𝐺 − 𝑒𝑑𝐵

Dissipated energy
Change in s.e.s.
Σ

𝐺
𝐵
−Δ𝑘𝑠𝑒
− Δ𝑘𝑠𝑒

0

0

Notes: Matter is measured in Gt while energy is measure in EJ. A ‘+’ sign denotes additions to the opening stock, whereas ‘–’ denotes reduction. 𝐺 = Greenland; 𝐵 = Brownland.
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Table 4. Physical flow matrix of the two-area economy (consolidated)

Initial stock
Resources converted into reserves

Worldwide material reserves

Worldwide non-renewable
energy reserves

Worldwide atmospheric CO2
concentration

Worldwide socio-economic
stock

𝐺
𝐵
+𝑘𝑚,–1
+ 𝑘𝑚,–1

𝐺 + 𝑘𝐵
+𝑘𝑒,–1
𝑒,–1

𝐺 + 𝐶𝑂𝐵
+𝐶𝑂2,–1
2,–1

𝐺
𝐵
+𝑘𝑠𝑒,–1
+ 𝑘𝑠𝑒,–1

𝐺 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣 𝐵
+𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑚,
𝑚

+𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐺 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐵
+𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵

CO2 emissions

𝐺
𝐵
+𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
+ 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡

Production of material goods
Extraction/use of matter/energy

−𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵

−𝑒𝑛𝐺 − 𝑒𝑛𝐵
−(1 − 𝜓1 ) ∙ (𝐶𝑂2𝐺 + 𝐶𝑂2𝐵 ) − 1

Net transfer to oceans/biosph.

−𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐺 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐵

Destruction of socio-ec. stock
Final stock

𝐺
𝐵
+𝑘𝑚
+ 𝑘𝑚

+𝑘𝑒𝐺 + 𝑘𝑒𝐵

+𝐶𝑂2𝐺 + 𝐶𝑂2𝐵

𝐺
𝐵
+𝑘𝑠𝑒
+ 𝑘𝑠𝑒

Notes: Matter is measured in Gt while energy is measure in EJ. A ‘+’ sign denotes inputs in the socio-economic system, whereas ‘–’ denotes outputs. 𝐺 = Greenland; 𝐵 = Brownland.
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Fig. 1. Baseline: selected variables

23

Fig. 2. Increase in risk aversion in both areas

24

Fig. 3. Preference for ‘greener’ financial assets

25

Fig. 4. Preference for ‘greener’ products

26

Fig. 5. Brownland government cuts green incentives, affecting import from Greenland

27

Fig. 6. Credit rationing in Brownland

28

Fig. 7. Greenland government undertakes mission-oriented green spending

29

Fig. 3b. Preference for ‘greener’ financial assets under a fixed exchange rate regime

30

Fig. 4b. Preference for ‘greener’ products under a fixed exchange rate regime

31

Fig. 5b. Brownland government cuts green incentives, affecting import from Greenland under a fixed exchange rate regime

32

Fig. 7b. Greenland government undertakes mission-oriented green spending under a fixed exchange rate regime

33

Fig. 8. Floating exchange rate: all scenarios

34

Appendix: the complete model
The basic model is made up of 225 equations. Exogenous variables and coefficients are more than one hundred and thirty.19 Superscript ‘𝐵’ stands for Brownland,
𝐵[𝐺]

𝐵[𝐺]
while superscript ‘𝐺’ marks Greenland’s variables and parameters. Government conventional spending, 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
, grows at rate 𝑔𝐺𝑂𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛 > 0 up until 2020 and 0

afterwards.
Block I. Disposable income, wealth and taxes
𝑌𝐷𝑟𝐵 = 𝑌𝑟𝐵 ⋅ (1 − 𝜃𝐵 )
𝐵 = 𝑌 𝐵 ⋅ (1 − 𝜃 )
𝑌𝐷𝑤
𝑤
𝐵
𝐵
𝑌𝐷ℎ𝑠,𝑟
= 𝑌𝐷𝑟𝐵 + 𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐵 + 𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐵
𝐵𝐺
𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐵 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐺 ) ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺
𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐵 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐺 ) ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐵
𝐵
= 𝑉𝑟,−1
+ 𝑌𝐷ℎ𝑠,𝑟
− 𝐶𝑟𝐵
𝐵
𝐵 − 𝐶𝐵
= 𝑉𝑤,−1
+ 𝑌𝐷𝑤
𝑤
𝑌𝐷𝑟𝐺 = 𝑌𝑟𝐺 ⋅ (1 − 𝜃𝐺 )
𝐺 = 𝑌 𝐺 ⋅ (1 − 𝜃 )
𝑌𝐷𝑤
𝑤
𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝑌𝐷ℎ𝑠,𝑟 = 𝑌𝐷𝑟 + 𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐺 + 𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐺
𝐺𝐵
𝐶𝐺𝑏𝐺 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺𝐵
𝐶𝐺𝑒𝐺 = 𝑑(𝑥𝑟𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐺
𝐺
𝑉𝑟𝐺 = 𝑉𝑟,−1
+ 𝑌𝐷ℎ𝑠,𝑟
− 𝐶𝑟𝐺
𝐺
𝐺 − 𝐶𝐺
𝑉𝑤𝐺 = 𝑉𝑤,−1
+ 𝑌𝐷𝑤
𝑤
𝑇𝐵 = (𝑌𝑟𝐵 + 𝑌𝑤𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝜃𝐵
𝑇𝐺 = (𝑌𝑟𝐺 + 𝑌𝑤𝐺 ) ⋅ 𝜃𝐺

𝑉𝑟𝐵
𝑉𝑤𝐵

Block II. Consumption and income shares
𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌𝐷𝐵 + 𝛼 𝐵 ⋅ 𝑉 𝐵
𝐶𝑟𝐵 = 𝛼1𝑟
𝑟
2𝑟
𝑟,−1
𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌𝐷𝐵 + 𝛼 𝐵 ⋅ 𝑉 𝐵
𝐶𝑤𝐵 = 𝛼1𝑤
𝑤
2𝑤
𝑤,−1
𝐵 + 𝑋 − 𝐼𝑀 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉
𝑌𝐵 = 𝐶𝑟𝐵 + 𝐶𝑤𝐵 + 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐷𝐺 + 𝛼 𝐺 ⋅ 𝑉 𝐺
𝐶𝑟𝐺 = 𝛼1𝑟
𝑟
2𝑟
𝑟,−1

Disposable income capitalists in Brownland – eq. 1
Disposable income workers in Brownland – eq. 2
Haig-Simons disposable income capitalists in Brownland – eq. 3
Revaluation of foreign bills held by Brownland capitalists – eq. 4
Revaluation of foreign shares held by Brownland capitalists – eq. 5
Wealth accumulation capitalists in Brownland – eq. 6
Wealth accumulation workers in Brownland – eq. 7
Disposable income capitalists in Greenland – eq. 8
Disposable income workers in Greenland – eq. 9
Haig-Simons disposable income capitalists in Greenland – eq. 10
Revaluation of foreign bills held by Greenland capitalists – eq. 11
Revaluation of foreign shares held by Greenland capitalists – eq. 12
Wealth accumulation capitalists in Greenland – eq. 13
Wealth accumulation workers in Greenland – eq. 14
Taxes paid in Brownland – eq. 15
Taxes paid in in Greenland – eq. 16

Consumption of capitalists in Brownland – eq. 17
Consumption of workers in Brownland – eq. 18
Total income in Brownland – eq. 19
Consumption of capitalists in Greenland eq. – 20

The model we simulated is slightly bigger, as it includes some checks and additional calculations. It amounts to 239 endogenous variables and 132 exogenous variables and parameters,
overall. We are happy to provide the program file upon request.
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𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐷𝐺 + 𝛼 𝐺 ⋅ 𝑉 𝐺
𝐶𝑤𝐺 = 𝛼1𝑤
𝑤
2𝑤
𝑤,−1
𝐺 + 𝑋 − 𝐼𝑀 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉
𝑌𝐺 = 𝐶𝑟𝐺 + 𝐶𝑤𝐺 + 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝑌𝑤𝐵 = 𝜔 ⋅ 𝑌𝐵
𝑌𝑤𝐺 = 𝜔𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺
𝐵
𝐵
𝐹𝑓𝐵 = 𝑌𝐵 − 𝑌𝑤𝐵 − 𝐷𝐴𝐵 − 𝑟𝑙,−1
⋅ 𝐿𝑓,−1

Consumption of workers in Greenland – eq. 21
Total income in Greenland – eq. 22
Total income of Brownland workers – eq. 23
Total income of Greenland workers – eq. 24
Gross profit of Brownland firms – eq. 25

𝐹𝑢𝐵 = 𝐹𝑓𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐵

Profit retained by Brownland firms – eq. 26

𝐵
𝐵𝐵 + 𝐸 𝐺𝐵 )
𝐹𝑑𝐵 = 𝑟𝑒,−1
⋅ (𝐸𝑠,−1
𝑠,−1
𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝐹𝑚 = 𝐹𝑓 − 𝐹𝑢 − 𝐹𝑑
𝐵𝐵
𝐵𝐺
𝐵𝐵 + 𝑥𝑟 ⋅ 𝑟
𝐵𝐺
𝑌𝑟𝐵 = 𝐹𝑚𝐵 + 𝐹𝑏𝐵 + 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺
𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 + 𝐹𝑑,−1 + 𝐹𝑑,−1
𝐹𝑑𝐵𝐺 = 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐺
𝐹𝑑𝐵𝐵 = 𝑟𝑒𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐵
𝐺
𝐺
𝐹𝑓𝐺 = 𝑌𝐺 − 𝑌𝑤𝐺 − 𝐷𝐴𝐺 − 𝑟𝑙,−1
⋅ 𝐿𝑓,−1
𝐹𝑢𝐺 = 𝐹𝑓𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐺
𝐺
𝐺𝐺 + 𝐸 𝐵𝐺 )
𝐹𝑑𝐺 = 𝑟𝑒,−1
⋅ (𝐸𝑠,−1
𝑠,−1
𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝐹𝑚 = 𝐹𝑓 − 𝐹𝑢 − 𝐹𝑑
𝐺𝐵
𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺 + 𝑥𝑟 ⋅ 𝑟
𝐺𝐵
𝑌𝑟𝐺 = 𝐹𝑚𝐺 + 𝐹𝑏𝐺 + 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐵
𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 + 𝐹𝑑,−1 + 𝐹𝑑,−1
𝐹𝑑𝐺𝐵 = 𝑥𝑟𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐵
𝐹𝑑𝐺𝐺 = 𝑟𝑒𝐺 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐺

Profit distributed by Brownland firms – eq. 27
Compensations of Brownland firms’ managers – eq. 28
Total income of Brownland capitalists – eq. 29
Dividends paid by Greenland firms to Brownland shareholders – eq. 30
Dividends paid by Brownland firms to Brownland shareholders – eq. 31
Gross profit of Greenland firms – eq. 32
Profit retained by Greenland firms – eq. 33
Profit distributed by Greenland firms – eq. 34
Compensations of Greenland firms’ managers – eq. 35
Total income of Greenland capitalists – eq. 36
Dividends paid by Brownland firms to Greenland shareholders – eq. 37
Dividends paid by Greenland firms to Greenland shareholders – eq. 38

Block III. Firms’ investment plans
𝐵 + 𝐾𝐵
𝐾𝐵 = 𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑛

Total accumulation capital in Brownland – eq. 39

𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝐾𝑔𝑟
= 𝐾𝑔𝑟,−1
+ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟
− 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟

Accumulation of green capital in Brownland – eq. 40

𝐵
𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛

Accumulation of conventional capital in Brownland – eq. 41
Total depreciation allowances in Brownland – eq. 42

𝐵
𝐵 − 𝐷𝐴𝐵
= 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛,−1
+ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵
𝐵
𝐷𝐴𝐵 = 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟 + 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = 𝛿 ⋅ 𝐾𝐵
𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐵
𝑔𝑟,−1
𝐵
𝐷𝐴𝐵𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 𝛿𝐵 ⋅ 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛,−1
𝐵
𝐾𝐵𝑡 = 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑌−1
𝐵 + 𝐷𝐴𝐵
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵 = 𝛾𝐵 ⋅ (𝐾𝐵𝑡 − 𝐾𝐵,−1 ) + 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵 = min[(𝜒 𝐵 ⋅ 𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝐵 + 𝜒 𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌 − 𝜒 𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟 𝐵 ), 𝐼𝑁𝑉 )
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟
𝑔𝑟
𝐵
𝐵
1
2
3
𝑙
𝐵 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉 − 𝐼𝑁𝑉 𝐵
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐵
𝑔𝑟

Depreciation allowances of green capital in Brownland – eq. 43
Depreciation allowances of conventional capital in Brownland – eq. 44
Capital stock target in Brownland – eq. 45
Demand for investment goods in Brownland – eq. 46
Demand for green investment in Brownland – eq. 47
Conventional investment in Brownland – eq. 48
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𝐵
𝐿𝑓𝐵 = 𝐿𝑓,−1
+ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵 − 𝐷𝐴𝐵 − 𝐹𝑢𝐵 − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐵 ) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐵 )

Demand for bank loans by Brownland firms – eq. 49

𝐺 + 𝐾𝐺
𝐾 𝐺 = 𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑛

Total accumulation of capital in Greenland – eq. 50

𝐺 = 𝐾𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝐾𝑔𝑟
𝑔𝑟,−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟 − 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐺 = 𝐾𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑐𝑜𝑛,−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛 − 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 + 𝐷𝐴𝐺
𝐷𝐴𝐺 = 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 = 𝛿 ⋅ 𝐾𝐺
𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝐺
𝑔𝑟,−1
𝐺
𝐷𝐴𝐺𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 𝛿𝐺 ⋅ 𝐾𝑐𝑜𝑛,−1
𝐺
𝐾𝐺𝑡 = 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑌−1
𝐺 + 𝐷𝐴𝐺
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺 = 𝛾𝐵 ⋅ (𝐾𝐺𝑡 − 𝐾𝐺,−1 ) + 𝐷𝐴𝑔𝑟
𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟 = min[(𝜒1 ⋅ 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟 + 𝜒2 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺 − 𝜒3 ⋅ 𝑟𝑙𝐺 ), 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺 )
𝐺 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉 − 𝐼𝑁𝑉 𝐺
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺
𝑔𝑟
𝐺
𝐺
𝐿𝑓 = 𝐿𝑓,−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺 − 𝐷𝐴𝐺 − 𝐹𝑢𝐺 − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐺 ) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐺 )

Accumulation of green capital in Greenland eq. 51
Accumulation of conventional capital in Greenland – eq. 52
Total depreciation allowances in Greenland – eq. 53
Depreciation allowances of green capital in Greenland – eq. 54
Depreciation allowances of conventional capital in Greenland – eq. 55
Capital stock target in Brownland – eq. 56
Demand for investment goods in Greenland – eq. 57
Demand for green investment in Greenland – eq. 58
Conventional investment in Greenland – eq. 59
Demand for bank loans by Greenland firms – eq. 60

Block IV. International trade
log(𝑋𝐵 ) = 𝜀0 − 𝜀1 ⋅ log(𝑥𝑟𝐵,−1 ) + 𝜀2 ⋅ log 𝑌𝐺

Exports of Brownland – eq. 61

log(𝐼𝑀𝐵 ) = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1 ⋅ log(𝑥𝑟𝐵,−1 ) + 𝜇2 ⋅ log(𝑌𝐵 )
𝑋𝐺 = 𝐼𝑀𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵
𝐼𝑀𝐺 = 𝑥𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵

Imports of Brownland – eq. 62
Exports of Greenland – eq. 63
Imports of Greenland – eq. 64

Block V. Demand for financial assets (portfolio equations)
𝐵𝑑𝐵𝐵
𝑉𝑟𝐵

= 𝜆10 + 𝜆11 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆12 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆13 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 − 𝜆14 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists – eq. 65

𝐵𝑑𝐵𝐺
𝑉𝑟𝐵

= 𝜆20 − 𝜆21 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 + 𝜆22 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆23 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 − 𝜆24 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists – eq. 66

= 𝜆70 − 𝜆71 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆72 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆73 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 + 𝜆74 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists - eq. 67

= 𝜆90 − 𝜆91 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆92 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 + 𝜆93 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 − 𝜆94 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists - eq. 68

= (𝑉𝑟𝐵 − 𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐵 − 𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐵 − (𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐺 + 𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐺 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ) ⋅ 𝜈𝐵
= 𝑉𝑟𝐵 − 𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐵 − 𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐵 − (𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐺 + 𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐺 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 − 𝑀𝑟𝐵
𝐵 ⋅𝜈
= 𝑉𝑊
𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
= 𝑉𝑤 − 𝑀𝑤
𝐵 + 𝐻𝐵
= 𝐻𝑤
𝑟

Holding of money in bank deposits by capitalists in Brownland – eq. 69
Holding of money in cash by capitalists in Brownland – eq. 70
Holding of money in bank deposits by workers in Brownland – eq. 71
Holding of money in cash by workers in Brownland – eq. 72
Total holding of money in cash in Brownland – eq. 73
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𝐸𝑑𝐵𝐺
𝑉𝑟𝐵

𝐸𝑑𝐵𝐵
𝑉𝑟𝐵
𝑀𝑟𝐵
𝐻𝑟𝐵
𝐵
𝑀𝑤
𝐵
𝐻𝑤
𝐻ℎ𝐵

𝐵𝑑𝐺𝐺
𝑉𝑟𝐺
𝐵𝑑𝐺𝐵
𝑉𝑟𝐺
𝐸𝑑𝐺𝐵
𝑉𝑟𝐺
𝐸𝑑𝐺𝐺
𝑉𝑟𝐺

= 𝜆40 − 𝜆41 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 + 𝜆42 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆43 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 − 𝜆44 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists – eq. 74

= 𝜆50 + 𝜆51 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆52 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆53 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 − 𝜆54 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists – eq. 75

= 𝜆80 − 𝜆81 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆82 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 + 𝜆83 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 − 𝜆84 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists - eq. 76

= 𝜆100 − 𝜆101 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 − 𝜆102 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺 − 𝜆103 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵 + 𝜆104 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺

Nominal demand for Greenland shares by Greenland capitalists - eq. 77

𝑀𝑟𝐺 = (𝑉𝑟𝐺 − 𝐵𝑠𝐺𝐺 − 𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐺 − (𝐵𝑠𝐺𝐵 + 𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝜈𝐺
𝐻𝑟𝐺 = 𝑉𝑟𝐺 − 𝐵𝑠𝐺𝐺 − 𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐺 − (𝐵𝑠𝐺𝐵 + 𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵 − 𝑀𝑟𝐺
𝐺 = 𝑉𝐺 ⋅ 𝜈
𝑀𝑤
𝐺
𝑊
𝐺 = 𝑉 𝐺 − 𝑀𝐺
𝐻𝑤
𝑤
𝑤
𝐺
𝐻ℎ𝐺 = 𝐻𝑤
+ 𝐻𝑟𝐺

Holding of money in bank deposits by capitalists in Greenland – eq. 78
Holding of money in cash by capitalists in Greenland – eq. 79
Holding of money in bank deposits by workers in Greenland – eq. 80
Holding of money in cash by workers in Greenland – eq. 81
Total holding of money in cash in Greenland – eq. 82

Block VI. Supplies and prices of financial assets (equilibrium conditions)
𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝑑𝐵𝐵
Supply of Brownland bills to Brownland households (capitalists) – eq. 83
𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺
𝐵𝑠 = 𝐵𝑑
Supply of Greenland bills to Greenland households (capitalists) – eq. 84
𝐺𝐵
𝐺𝐵
𝐵𝑠 = 𝐵𝑑 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺
Supply of Brownland bills to Greenland households (capitalists) – eq. 85
𝐵𝐺
𝐵𝐺
𝐵𝑠 = 𝐵𝑑 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵
Supply of Greenland bills to Brownland households (capitalists) – eq. 86
𝐵𝐺
𝐵𝐺
𝐸𝑠 = 𝐸𝑑 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵
Nominal supply of Greenland shares to Brownland capitalists - eq. 87
𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺
𝐸𝑠 = 𝐸𝑑
Nominal supply of Greenland shares to Greenland capitalists - eq. 88
𝐺
𝑒𝑠𝐺 = 𝑒𝑠,−1
+ 𝜉𝐺 ⋅

𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺,−1
𝐺
𝑝𝑒,−1

𝐸𝑑𝐺𝐺 +𝐸𝑑𝐵𝐺
𝑒𝑠𝐺
𝐺𝐵
𝐸𝑠 = 𝐸𝑑𝐺𝐵 ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺
𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐵 = 𝐸𝑑𝐵𝐵
𝐼𝑁𝑉
𝐵
𝑒𝑠𝐵 = 𝑒𝑠,−1
+ 𝜉𝐵 ⋅ 𝑝𝐵𝐵,−1

𝑝𝑒𝐺 =

𝑒,−1

𝑝𝑒𝐵 =
𝑟𝑒𝐺 =

𝐸𝑑𝐵𝐵 +𝐸𝑑𝐺𝐵
𝑒𝑠𝐵
𝐺
(1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑦
)

𝑟𝑒𝐺𝑇 =

𝐹𝑓𝐺
𝐺 ⋅𝑝𝐺
𝑒𝑠,−1
𝑒,−1

Quantity of shares issued by Greenland firms - eq. 89
Unit price of shares issued by Greenland firms - eq. 90
Nominal supply of Brownland shares to Greenland capitalists - eq. 91
Nominal supply of Brownland shares to Brownland capitalists - eq. 92
Quantity of shares issued by Greenland firms - eq. 93
Unit price of shares issued by Brownland firms - eq. 94

𝐺
⋅ 𝑟𝐺 + 𝜋𝑑𝑦
⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐺𝑇

Dividend yield on Greenland firms’ shares - eq. 95
Return rate on Greenland firms’ equity - eq. 96
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𝐵
𝐵
𝑟𝑒𝐵 = (1 − 𝜋𝑑𝑦
) ⋅ 𝑟𝐵 + 𝜋𝑑𝑦
⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝐵𝑇

𝑟𝑒𝐵𝑇 = 𝑒 𝐵

𝐹𝑓𝐵

𝐵
𝑠,−1⋅𝑝𝑒,−1

Dividend yield on Brownland firms’ shares - eq. 97
Return rate on Brownland firms’ equity - eq. 98

Block VII. The banking sector
𝐵 + 𝑀𝐵
𝑀𝑠𝐵 = 𝑀𝑤
𝑟
𝐿𝐵𝑠 = 𝐿𝑓𝐵

Supply of deposits in Brownland (liabilities of Brownland banks) – eq. 99
Supply of loans to firms in Brownland - eq. 100

𝐵
𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
= 𝑀𝑠𝐵 − 𝐿𝐵𝑠
𝐵
𝜁𝐵 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
>0

Brownland bills notionally bought by Brownland banks – eq. 101
Trigger for notional Brownland bills bought by Brownland banks – eq. 102

𝐵
𝐵𝑏𝐵 = 𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
⋅ 𝜁𝐵

Brownland bills actually bought by Brownland bank – eq. 103

𝐵
𝐴𝐵𝑑 = −𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
⋅ (1 − 𝜁𝐵 )
𝐵
𝐵
𝐴𝑠 = 𝐴𝑑
𝐵
𝐹𝑏𝐵 = 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1
+ 𝑟𝑙𝐵 ⋅ 𝐿𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺 + 𝑀𝐺
𝑀𝑠𝐺 = 𝑀𝑤
𝑟
𝐿𝐺𝑠 = 𝐿𝑓𝐺
𝐺
𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
= 𝑀𝑠𝐺 − 𝐿𝐺𝑠
𝐺
𝜁𝐺 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
>0
𝐺
𝐺
𝐵𝑏 = 𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡 ⋅ 𝜁𝐺
𝐺
𝐴𝐺𝑑 = −𝐵𝑏,𝑛𝑜𝑡
⋅ (1 − 𝜁𝐺 )
𝐺
𝐺
𝐴𝑠 = 𝐴𝑑
𝐺
𝐹𝑏𝐺 = 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑏,−1
+ 𝑟𝑙𝐺 ⋅ 𝐿𝐺𝑠,−1

Advances needed by Brownland banks from Brownland central bank – eq. 104
Advances provided to Brownland banks by Brownland central bank – eq. 105
Profits of banks in Brownland – eq. 106
Supply of deposits in Greenland (liabilities of Brownland banks) – eq. 107
Supply of bank loans to firms in Greenland – eq. 108
Greenland bills notionally bought by Greenland banks – eq. 109
Trigger for notional Greenland bills bought by Greenland bank – eq. 110
Greenland bills actually bought by Greenland banks – eq. 111
Advances needed by Greenland banks from Greenland central bank – eq. 112
Advances provided to Greenland banks by Greenland central bank – eq. 113
Profits of banks in Greenland – eq. 114

Block VIII. The central bank and the government sector
𝐵𝐵
𝐵𝑐𝑏
= 𝐵𝑠𝐵 − 𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐵 − 𝐵𝑠𝐺𝐵 − 𝐵𝑏𝐵
𝐵𝐵
𝐻𝑠𝐵 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏
+ 𝐴𝐵𝑠
𝐵
𝐵𝐵
𝐹𝑐𝑏 = 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1

Brownland bills purchased by Brownland central bank – eq. 115
Supply of cash in Brownland – eq. 116
Profits of central bank in Brownland – eq. 117

𝐺𝐺
𝐵𝑐𝑏
= 𝐵𝑠𝐺 − 𝐵𝑠𝐺𝐺 − 𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐺 − 𝐵𝑏𝐺
𝐺𝐺
𝐻𝑠𝐺 = 𝐵𝑐𝑏
+ 𝐴𝐺𝑠
𝐺
𝐺𝐺
𝐹𝑐𝑏
= 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑐𝑏,−1
𝐵 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝐵 + 𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝐵
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑔𝑟

Greenland bills purchased by Greenland central bank – eq. 118
Supply of cash in Greenland – eq. 119
Profits of central bank in Greenland – eq. 120
Total government expenditure in Brownland – eq. 121
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𝐺 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝐺 + 𝐺𝑂𝑉 𝐺
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑔𝑟

𝐵𝑠𝐵
𝐵𝑠𝐺

=
=

𝐵
𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺
𝐵𝑠,−1

+
+

𝐵
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐺
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡

𝐵
+ 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝐺
+ 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1

Total government expenditure in Greenland – eq. 122
𝐵
− 𝑇𝐵 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏
𝐺
− 𝑇𝐺 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏

Government budget constraint in Brownland – eq. 123
Government budget constraint in Greenland – eq. 124

Block IX. The exchange rates
𝑥𝑟𝐺 =

𝐺𝐵 +𝑟 𝐵 ⋅𝐸𝐺𝐵 −𝑑(𝐵 𝐺𝐵 )−𝑑(𝐸𝐺𝐵 )−𝑋 +𝐼𝑀
𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅𝐵𝑠,−1
𝑠
𝑠
𝐵
𝐵
𝑒,−1 𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺 +𝑟 𝐺 ⋅𝐸𝐵𝐺 −𝑑(𝐵 𝐵𝐺 )−𝑑(𝐸𝐵𝐺 )
𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅𝐵𝑠,−1
𝑠
𝑠
𝑒,−1 𝑠,−1

1

Brownland exchange rate20 – eq. 125

𝑥𝑟𝐵 = 𝑥𝑟

Greenland exchange rate – eq. 126

Block X. The ecosystem: material resources and reserves
𝐵
𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
= 𝜇𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌𝐵
𝐺
𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡 = 𝜇𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺
𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵 = 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
− 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐵
𝐺
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 = 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐵 = 𝜌𝐵 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐵
𝑟𝑒𝑐𝐺 = 𝜌𝐺 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐺
𝐵
𝐵
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐵 = 𝜇𝐵 ⋅ (𝐷𝐴𝐵 + 𝐶𝑤,−1
+ 𝐶𝑟,−1
− 𝑋𝐵,−1 + 𝐼𝑀𝐵,−1 )
𝐺
𝐺
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐺 = 𝜇𝐺 ⋅ (𝐷𝐴𝐺 + 𝐶𝑤,−1 + 𝐶𝑟,−1 − 𝑋𝐺,−1 + 𝐼𝑀𝐺,−1 )

Production of material goods in Brownland – eq. 127
Production of material goods in Greenland – eq. 128
Extraction of matter in Brownland – eq. 129
Extraction of matter in Greenland – eq. 130
Recycled socio-economic stock in Brownland – eq. 131
Recycled socio-economic stock in Greenland – eq. 131
Discarded socio-economic stock in Brownland – eq. 133
Discarded socio-economic stock in Greenland – eq. 134

𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝑘𝑠𝑒
= 𝑘𝑠𝑒,−1
+ 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡
− 𝜇𝐵 ⋅ (𝑋𝐵,−1 − 𝐼𝑀𝐵,−1 ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐵
𝐺 = 𝑘𝐺
𝐺
𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝑠𝑒,−1 + 𝑦𝑚𝑎𝑡 − 𝜇𝐺 ⋅ (𝑋𝐺,−1 − 𝐼𝑀𝐺,−1 ) − 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝐺
𝐵)
𝑤𝑎𝐵 = 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵 − 𝑑(𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝐺 )
𝑤𝑎𝐺 = 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 − 𝑑(𝑘𝑠𝑒
𝐵 = 𝑘𝐵
𝐵
𝑘𝑚
𝑚,−1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑚 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵
𝐺 = 𝑘𝐺
𝐺
𝑘𝑚
𝑚,−1 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑚 − 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺 '
𝐵 + 𝑘𝐺 '
𝑘𝑚 = 𝑘𝑚
𝑚
𝐵 = 𝜎 𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐵
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑚
𝑚
𝑚,−1
𝐺 = 𝜎 𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐺
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑚
𝑚
𝑚,−1
𝐵 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐵
𝐵
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
−
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑚
𝑚,−1
𝐺 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐺
𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
𝑚,−1 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑚
𝐵 + 𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
𝑚

Socio-economic stock in Brownland – eq. 135
Socio-economic stock in Greenland – eq. 136
Waste generated by production activities in Brownland – eq. 137
Waste generated by production activities in Greenland – eq. 138
Stock of material reserves in Brownland – eq. 139
Stock of material reserves in Greenland – eq. 140
World-wide stock of material reserves – eq. 141
Material resources converted to reserves in Brownland – eq. 142
Material resources converted to reserves in Greenland – eq. 143
Stock of material resources in Brownland – eq. 144
Stock of material resources in Greenland – eq. 145
World-wide stock of material resources – eq. 146

𝐺

20

Quantity of Brownland currency per unit of Greenland currency (e.g. USD).
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𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐵 =
𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐺 =

𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵
𝑐𝑎𝑟
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺
𝑐𝑎𝑟

Carbon mass of (non-renewable) energy in Brownland – eq. 147
Carbon mass of (non-renewable) energy in Greenland – eq. 148

𝑜2𝐵 = 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐵
𝑜2𝐺 = 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 − 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝐺

Mass of oxygen in Brownland – eq. 149
Mass of oxygen in Greenland – eq. 150

Block XI. The ecosystem: energy resources and reserves
𝑒𝐵 = 𝜖𝐵 ⋅ 𝑌𝐵
𝑒𝑟𝐵 = 𝜂𝐵 ⋅ 𝑒𝐵
𝑒𝑛𝐵 = 𝑒𝐵 − 𝑒𝑟𝐵
𝑒𝑑𝐵 = 𝑒𝑟𝐵 + 𝑒𝑛𝐵
𝑒𝐺 = 𝜖𝐺 ⋅ 𝑌𝐺
𝑒𝑟𝐺 = 𝜂𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝐺
𝑒𝑛𝐺 = 𝑒𝐺 − 𝑒𝑟𝐺
𝑒𝑑𝐺 = 𝑒𝑟𝐺 + 𝑒𝑛𝐺
𝐵
𝑘𝑒𝐵 = 𝑘𝑒,−1
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐵 − 𝑒𝑛𝐵
𝐺
𝑘𝑒𝐺 = 𝑘𝑒,−1
+ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐺 − 𝑒𝑛𝐺
𝑘𝑒 = 𝑘𝑒𝐵 + 𝑘𝑒𝐺
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐵 = 𝜎𝑒𝐵 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐵
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐺 = 𝜎𝑒𝐺 ⋅ 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐺
𝐵
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐵 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒,−1
− 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐵
𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐺 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒,−1
− 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐵 + 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐺

Energy required for production in Brownland – eq. 151
Renewable energy in Brownland – eq. 152
Non-renewable energy in Brownland – eq. 153
Dissipated energy at the end of the period in Brownland – eq. 154
Energy required for production in Greenland – eq. 155
Renewable energy in Greenland – eq. 156
Non-renewable energy in Greenland – eq. 157
Dissipated energy at the end of the period in Greenland – eq. 158
Stock of energy reserves in Brownland – eq. 159
Stock of energy reserves in Greenland – eq. 160
World-wide stock of energy reserves – eq. 161
Energy resources converted to reserves in Brownland – eq. 162
Energy resources converted to reserves in Greenland – eq. 163
Stock of energy resources in Brownland – eq. 164
Stock of energy resources in Greenland – eq. 165
World-wide stock of energy resources – eq. 166

Block XII. The ecosystem: emissions and climate change
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵 = 𝛽𝐵 ⋅ 𝑒𝑛𝐵
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺 = 𝛽𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝑛𝐺
𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠 = 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑏 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑔
𝑐𝑜2𝐵 = 𝜓𝑏 ⋅ 𝑐𝑜2𝐵,−1 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵
𝑐𝑜2𝐺 = 𝜓𝐺 ⋅ 𝑐𝑜2𝐺,−1 + 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺
𝑐𝑜2 = 𝑐𝑜2𝐵 + 𝑐𝑜2𝐺
𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝−1 + 𝜏𝐵 ⋅ 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐵 + 𝜏𝐺 ⋅ 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝐺

Industrial emissions of CO2 in Brownland – eq. 167
Industrial emissions of CO2 in Greenland – eq. 168
World-wide industrial emissions of CO2 – eq. 169
Cumulative emissions of CO2 in Brownland – eq. 170
Cumulative emissions of CO2 in Greenland – eq. 171
World-wide cumulative emissions of CO2 – eq. 172
Average atmospheric temperature – eq. 173
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Block XIII. The ecosystem: ecological efficiency
𝐵
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝐵 ⋅
𝜇𝐵 = 𝜇𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐵
𝐺
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝐺
𝜇𝐵 = 𝜇𝑔𝑟
⋅
𝐵 ⋅
𝜖𝐵 = 𝜖𝑔𝑟
𝐺 ⋅
𝜖𝐺 = 𝜖𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐺
𝐵
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐵
𝐺
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝐵 ⋅
𝛽𝐵 = 𝛽𝑔𝑟
𝐺 ⋅
𝛽𝐺 = 𝛽𝑔𝑟
𝐵 ⋅
𝜂𝐵 = 𝜂𝑔𝑟
𝐺 ⋅
𝜂𝐺 = 𝜂𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐺
𝐵
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐵
𝐺
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐺
𝐵
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐵
𝐺
𝑘𝑔𝑟

𝑘𝐺

𝐵 ⋅
+ 𝜇𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺
+ 𝜇𝑐𝑜𝑛
⋅

𝐺
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝑘𝐺
𝐵
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐵 ⋅
+ 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝐺 ⋅
+ 𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐵
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑘𝐵

𝑘𝐵
𝐺
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑘𝐺

Matter intensity coefficient in Brownland – eq. 174
Matter intensity coefficient in Greenland – eq. 175
Energy intensity coefficient in Brownland – eq. 177
Energy intensity coefficient in Greenland – eq. 178

𝐵 ⋅
+ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐵
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑘𝐵

CO2 intensity coefficient in Brownland – eq. 179

𝐺 ⋅
+ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐺
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑘𝐺

CO2 intensity coefficient in Greenland – eq. 180

𝐵 ⋅
+ 𝜂𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐵
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑘𝐵

Renewable energy share in Brownland – eq. 181

𝐺 ⋅
+ 𝜂𝑐𝑜𝑛

𝐺
𝑘𝑐𝑜𝑛
𝑘𝐺

Renewable energy share in Greenland – eq. 182

Block XIV. The ecosystem: ecological feedbacks
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐵

𝐵 =
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚
𝑘𝐵

𝑚,−1

𝑚𝑎𝑡𝐺

𝐺 =
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚
𝑘𝐺

𝑚,−1

𝑒𝑛

𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝐵 = 𝑘 𝐵 𝐵

𝑒,−1

𝑒𝑛

Matter depletion ratio in Brownland – eq. 183
Matter depletion ratio in Greenland – eq. 184
Energy depletion ratio in Brownland – eq. 185

𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝐺 = 𝑘 𝐺 𝐺

Energy depletion ratio in Greenland – eq. 186

𝐵 ) + 𝛿 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙 𝐵 ) + 𝛿 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝)
𝛿𝐵 = 𝛿𝐵,−1 + 𝛿11 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚
12
𝑒
13
𝐺
𝐺
𝛿𝐺 = 𝛿𝐺,−1 + 𝛿21 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚 ) + 𝛿22 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒 ) + 𝛿23 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝)
𝐵 = 𝛼𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝛼1𝑤
1𝑤,−1 + 𝛼11 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑚 ) + 𝛼12 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒 ) + 𝛼13 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝)
𝐺 = 𝛼𝐺
𝐺
𝐺
𝛼1𝑤
1𝑤,−1 + 𝛼21 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑚 ) + 𝛼22 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑒 ) + 𝛼23 ⋅ 𝑑(𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝)

Depreciation of capital stock in Brownland – eq. 187
Depreciation of capital stock in Greenland – eq. 188
Propensity to consume of workers in Brownland – eq. 189
Propensity to consume of workers in Greenland – eq. 190

𝑒,−1

Block XV. Auxiliary equations for domestic and foreign balances
𝐵
𝐵 +𝑟
𝐵
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐵 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
Government deficit in Brownland – eq. 191
𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 − 𝑇𝐵 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏,−1
𝐺
𝐺 +𝑟
𝐺
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐺 = 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 − 𝑇𝐺 − 𝐹𝑐𝑏,−1
𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐴𝐵 = 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐵 + 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐵
𝑁𝐴𝐹𝐴𝐺 = 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐺 + 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐺

Government deficit in Greenland – eq. 192
Net accumulation of financial assets in Brownland – eq. 193
Net accumulation of financial assets in Greenland - eq. 194
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𝐵𝐺 + 𝑟 𝐺
𝐵𝐺
𝐺𝐵
𝐵
𝐺𝐵
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐵 = 𝑇𝐵𝐵 + 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ⋅ (𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1 ) − 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 − 𝑟𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1

Current account balance of Brownland – eq. 195

𝐺𝐵 + 𝑟 𝐵
𝐺𝐵
𝐵𝐺
𝐺
𝐵𝐺
𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐺 = 𝑇𝐵𝐺 + 𝑥𝑟𝐵 ⋅ (𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
Current account balance of Greenland – eq. 196
𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1 ) − 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 − 𝑟𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐵𝐺
𝐺𝐵
𝐵𝐺
𝐺𝐵
𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐵 = −𝑑(𝐵𝑠 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 + 𝑑(𝐵𝑠 ) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐺 + 𝑑(𝐸𝑠 )
Financial account balance of Brownland – eq. 1907
𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐺 = −𝑑(𝐵𝑠𝐺𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵 + 𝑑(𝐵𝑠𝐵𝐺 ) − 𝑑(𝐸𝑠𝐺𝐵 ) ⋅ 𝑥𝑟𝐵 + 𝑑(𝐸𝑠𝐵𝐺 )
Financial account balance of Greenland – eq. 198
𝑇𝐵𝐵 = 𝑋𝐵 − 𝐼𝑀𝐵
Trade balance of Brownland – eq. 199
𝑇𝐵𝐺 = 𝑋𝐺 − 𝐼𝑀𝐺
Trade balance of Greenland – eq. 200
𝐵𝑃𝐵 = 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐵 + 𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐵
Balance of payment of Brownland – eq. 201
𝐵𝑃𝐺 = 𝐶𝐴𝐵𝐺 + 𝐾𝐴𝐵𝐺
Balance of payment of Greenland – eq. 202

Block XVI. National product and inequality indices
𝐵𝐺 + 𝑟 𝐺
𝐵𝐺
𝐺𝐵
𝐵
𝐺𝐵
𝐺𝑁𝑃𝐵 = 𝑌𝐵 + 𝑥𝑟𝐺 ⋅ (𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1 ) − 𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 − 𝑟𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1

Gross National product of Brownland – eq. 203

𝐺𝐵 + 𝑟 𝐵
𝐺𝐵
𝐵𝐺
𝐺
𝐵𝐺
𝐺𝑁𝑃𝐺 = 𝑌𝐺 + 𝑥𝑟𝐵 ⋅ (𝑟𝐵,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1
Gross National product of Greenland – eq. 204
𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1 ) − 𝑟𝐺,−1 ⋅ 𝐵𝑠,−1 − 𝑟𝑒,−1 ⋅ 𝐸𝑠,−1
𝐵
𝐵
𝐵
𝑌𝐷𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑌𝐷𝑤 + 𝑌𝐷𝑟
Total disposable income in Brownland – eq. 205
𝑌𝐷 𝐵

𝑟
𝐵 =
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑌𝐷
𝑌𝐷 𝐵

Income inequality index in Brownland – eq. 206

𝐺 = 𝑌𝐷𝐺 + 𝑌𝐷𝐺
𝑌𝐷𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑤
𝑟

Total disposable income in Greenland – eq. 207

𝑡𝑜𝑡

𝐺
𝐺 = 𝑌𝐷𝑟
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑌𝐷
𝐺
𝑌𝐷𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝐵
𝐵
𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡 = 𝑉𝑟 + 𝑉𝑤𝐵
𝑉𝐵
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑉𝐵 = 𝑉 𝑟𝐵
𝑡𝑜𝑡

𝐺 = 𝑉𝐺 + 𝑉𝐺
𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑟
𝑤

𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑉𝐺 =

𝑉𝑟𝐺
𝐺
𝑉𝑡𝑜𝑡

Income inequality index in Greenland – eq. 208
Total net wealth in Brownland – eq. 209
Wealth inequality index in Brownland – eq. 210
Total net wealth in Greenland – eq. 211
Wealth inequality index in Brownland – eq. 212

Block XVII. Additional financial variables and indices
𝑞𝐺 =
𝑞𝐵 =

𝐺 ⋅𝑝𝐺 +𝐿𝐺
𝑒𝑠,−1
𝑒,−1
𝑓

𝐾𝐺

𝐵
𝐵
𝑒𝑠,−1
⋅𝑝𝑒,−1
+𝐿𝐵
𝑓

𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑓𝐺 =
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑓𝐵 =

𝐾𝐵
𝐿𝐺
𝑓
𝐺 ⋅𝑝𝐺 +𝐿𝐺
𝑒𝑠,−1
𝑒,−1
𝑓
𝐵
𝐿𝑓
𝐵 ⋅𝑝𝐵 +𝐿𝐵
𝑒𝑠,−1
𝑒,−1
𝑓

Tobin’s q of Greenland firms - eq. 213
Tobin’s q of Brownland firms - eq. 214
Leverage ratio of Greenland firms - eq. 215
Leverage ratio of Brownland firms - eq. 216
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𝑝𝑒𝐺
𝐺
𝐺 /𝑒𝑠,−1

Price-earnings ratio of Greenland firms’ shares - eq. 217

𝑝𝑒𝐵
𝐵
𝐵 /𝑒𝑠,−1

Price-earnings ratio of Brownland firms’ shares - eq. 218

𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐺 = 𝐹
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐵 = 𝐹
𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑏𝐺 =

𝐺
𝐺
𝐴𝐺
𝑠 +𝑀𝑠 −𝐿𝑠
𝐺
𝑀𝑠

Liquidity ratio of Greenland banks - eq. 219

𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑏𝐵 =

𝐵
𝐵
𝐴𝐵
𝑠 +𝑀𝑠 −𝐿𝑠
𝐵
𝑀𝑠

Liquidity ratio of Brownland banks - eq. 220

Block XVIII. Credit rationing and other shocks
𝐺
𝐺
𝛾𝐺 = 𝛾10 − 𝛾11 ⋅ 𝑟𝐺,−1 − 𝛾12 ⋅ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑓,−1
+ 𝛾13 ⋅ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑏,−1
+ 𝛾14 ⋅
𝐺
𝑟𝑙𝐺 = 𝑟𝑙,−1
− 𝛾15 ⋅

𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺,−1

𝐺
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟,−1

𝐵
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟,−1

𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵,−1

Speed of adjustment of capital to target level in Greenland - eq. 221
Interest rate on bank loans in Greenland - eq. 222

𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐺,−1

𝐵
𝐵
𝛾𝐵 = 𝛾20 − 𝛾21 ⋅ 𝑟𝐵,−1 − 𝛾22 ⋅ 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑓,−1
+ 𝛾23 ⋅ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑏,−1
+ 𝛾24 ⋅
𝐵
𝑟𝑙𝐵 = 𝑟𝑙,−1
− 𝛾25 ⋅

𝐺
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟,−1

𝐵
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑔𝑟,−1

𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐵,−1

Speed of adjustment of capital to target level in Brownland - eq. 223
Interest rate on bank loans in Brownland - eq. 224

𝐵)
𝜇2 = 𝜇2,−1 + 𝛾3 ⋅ 𝑑(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟

Propensity to import of Brownland - eq. 225

Redundant equations
𝐻𝑠𝐵 = 𝐻ℎ𝐵
𝐻𝑠𝐺 = 𝐻ℎ𝐺

Supply of cash matches demand for cash in Brownland
Supply of cash matches demand for cash in Greenland
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Table 5. Initial values of variables and coefficient values for the baseline and the experiments

Starting values of parameters of the two open economies
Brownland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of income
Brownland workers’ propensity to consume out of income
Greenland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of income
Greenland workers’ propensity to consume out of income
Brownland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of wealth
Brownland workers’ propensity to consume out of wealth
Greenland capitalists’ propensity to consume out of wealth
Greenland workers’ propensity to consume out of wealth
Parameter in Brownland export equation
Parameter in Brownland export equation
Parameter in Brownland export equation
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland bills by Greenland capitalists

Symbols and baseline
values

Values under alternative scenarios
Scenario 1

Scenario 2

0.305

0.299

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

Scenario 5

Scenario 6

𝐵
𝛼1𝑟
= 0.65
𝐵
𝛼1𝑤 = 0.85
𝐺
𝛼1𝑟
= 0.65
𝐺
𝛼1𝑤 = 0.85
𝐵
𝛼2𝑟
= 0.13333
𝐵
𝛼2𝑤 = 0.13333
𝐺
𝛼2𝑟
= 0.13333
𝐺
𝛼2𝑤 = 0.13333

𝜀0 = −2.1
𝜀1 = 0.5
𝜀2 = 1.228
𝜆10 = 0.3
𝜆11 = 1
𝜆12 = 1
𝜆13 = 0
𝜆14 = 0
𝜆20 = 0.1
𝜆21 = 1
𝜆22 = 1
𝜆23 = 0
𝜆24 = 0
𝜆40 = 0.3
𝜆41 = 1
𝜆42 = 1
𝜆43 = 0
𝜆44 = 0
𝜆50 = 0.1
𝜆51 = 1
𝜆52 = 1
𝜆53 = 0
𝜆54 = 0
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1.226

0.101

0.305

0.301

0.099

[1.226]

Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Greenland shares by Greenland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Portfolio parameter defining demand for Brownland shares by Brownland capitalists
Shares issues to investment ratio in Greenland
Shares issues to investment ratio in Brownland
Real supply of shares in Brownland
Real supply of shares in Greenland
Unit price of shares in Brownland
Unit price of shares in Greenland
Parameter in Brownland import equation
Parameter in Brownland import equation
Parameter in Brownland import equation
Average tax rate in Brownland
Average tax rate in Greenland
Depreciation rate in Brownland
Depreciation rate in Greenland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland

𝜆70 = 0.05
𝜆71 = 0
𝜆72 = 0
𝜆73 = 0.01
𝜆74 = 0.01
𝜆75 = 0
𝜆80 = 0.05
𝜆81 = 0
𝜆82 = 0
𝜆83 = 0.01
𝜆84 = 0.01
𝜆90 = 0.1
𝜆91 = 0
𝜆92 = 0
𝜆93 = 0.01
𝜆94 = 0.01
𝜆100 = 0.1
𝜆101 = 0
𝜆102 = 0
𝜆103 = 0.01
𝜆104 = 0.01
𝜉𝐺 = 0.01
𝜉𝐵 = 0.01
𝑒𝑠𝐵 = 1
𝑒𝑠𝐺 = 1
𝑝𝑒𝐵 = 1
𝑝𝑒𝐺 = 1
𝜇0 = − 2.1
𝜇1 = 0.5
𝜇2 = 1.228
𝜃𝐵 = 0.2
𝜃𝐺 = 0.2
𝛿𝐵 = 0.08
𝛿𝐺 = 0.08
𝛾10 = 0.1603
𝛾11 = 0.1
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0

0.051

0

0.049

0

0.09

0

0.101

1.23

[1.23]

Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Greenland
Sensitivity of loan interest rate to green investment share in Greenland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland
Parameter of capital adjustment speed in Brownland
Sensitivity of loan interest rate to green investment share in Brownland
Sensitivity of Brownland import to government spending
Target capital to output ratio
Parameter of Brownland green investment function
Parameter of Brownland green investment function
Parameter of Brownland green investment function
Parameter of Greenland green investment function
Parameter of Greenland green investment function
Parameter of Greenland green investment function
Wage share to total income in Brownland
Wage share to total income in Greenland
Profit retention rate of Brownland firms
Profit retention rate of Greenland firms
Percentage of money held in Brownland deposits
Percentage of money held in Greenland deposits
Parameter defining dividend yield in Greenland

𝛾12 = 0.01
𝛾13 = 0.01
𝛾14 = 0
𝛾15 = 0
𝛾20 = 0.1603
𝛾21 = 0.1
𝛾22 = 0.01
𝛾23 = 0.01
𝛾24 = 0
𝛾25 = 0
𝛾3 = 0
𝜅 = 0.85
𝜒1𝐵 = 0.2
𝜒2𝐵 = 0.02
𝜒3𝐵 = 0
𝜒1𝐺 = 0.2
𝜒2𝐺 = 0.02
𝜒3𝐺 = 0
𝜔𝐵 = 0.62
𝜔𝐺 = 0.62
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐵 = 0.02
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐺 = 0.02
𝜈𝐵 = 0.7
𝜈𝐺 = 0.7
𝐺
𝜋𝑑𝑦
= 0.00555

Parameter defining dividend yield in Brownland

𝐵
𝜋𝑑𝑦
= 0.00555

Starting values of variables and parameter values for the ecosystem
Material intensity of green capital in Brownland (Kg/USD)
Material intensity of green capital in Greenland (Kg/USD)
Material intensity of conventional capital in Brownland (Kg/USD)
Material intensity of conventional capital in Greenland (Kg/USD)
Energy intensity of green capital in Brownland (Ej/USD)
Energy intensity of green capital in Greenland (Ej/USD)
Energy intensity of conventional capital in Brownland (Ej/USD)

𝐵
𝜇𝑔𝑟
= 0.71
𝐺
𝜇𝑔𝑟 = 0.51
𝐵
𝜇𝑐𝑜𝑛
= 0.86
𝐺
𝜇𝑐𝑜𝑛
= 0.66
𝐵
𝜖𝑔𝑟
= 7.65
𝐺
𝜖𝑔𝑟
= 5.65
𝐵
𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 9.32
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0.1
0.08
0.015

0.08

0.69
0.69

Energy intensity of conventional capital in Greenland (Ej/USD)
CO2 intensity of green capital in Brownland (Gt/Ej
CO2 intensity of green capital in Greenland (Gt/Ej)
CO2 intensity of conventional capital in Brownland (Gt/Ej)
CO2 intensity of conventional capital in Greenland (Gt/Ej)
Rate of decline of CO2 intensity in Brownland after 2020

𝐺
𝜖𝑐𝑜𝑛
= 7.32
𝐵
𝛽𝑔𝑟 = 0.045
𝐺
𝛽𝑔𝑟
= 0.025
𝐵
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0.085
𝐺
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛
= 0.065
𝐵
𝑔𝛽 = 0.02

Rate of decline of CO2 intensity in Greenland after 2020

𝑔𝛽𝐺 = 0.04

Initial value of CO2 emissions in Brownland
Initial value of CO2 emissions in Greenland
Autoregressive parameter of cumulative CO 2 emissions in Brownland (accounting for
carbon cycle)
Autoregressive parameter of cumulative CO2 emissions in Greenland (accounting for
carbon cycle)
Approximate value of cumulative CO 2 emissions of Brownland in 1950s (billion tonnes
CO2, Gt)
Approximate value of cumulative CO2 emissions of Greenland in 1950s (billion tonnes
CO2, Gt)
Initial value of average atmospheric temperature (C)
Sensitivity of temperature to Brownland emissions
Sensitivity of temperature to Greenland emissions
Recycling rate in Brownland
Recycling rate in Greenland
Conversion rate of material resources into reserves in Brownland
Conversion rate of material resources into reserves in Greenland
Conversion rate of non-renewable energy resources into reserves in Brownland
Conversion rate of non-renewable energy resources into reserves in Greenland
Initial value of matter resources of Brownland (Gt)
Initial value of matter resources of Greenland (Gt)
Initial value of non-renewable energy resources of Brownland (Ej)
Initial value of non-renewable energy resources of Greenland (Ej)
Initial value of socio-economic stock of Brownland (Gt)
Initial value of socio-economic stock of Brownland (Gt)
Coefficient converting Gt of carbon into Gt of CO 2
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Brownland firms to matter depletion
Initial value of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Brownland firms to energy depl.
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Brownland firms to climate change

𝛽0𝐵 = 4.5
𝛽0𝐺 = 4.5
𝜓𝐵 = 0.999
𝜓𝐺 = 0.999
𝑐𝑜2𝐵 = 300
𝑐𝑜2𝐺 = 300
𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 13
𝜏𝐵 = 7.69𝑒 − 4
𝜏𝐺 = 7.69𝑒 − 4
𝜌𝐵 = 0.2
𝜌𝐺 = 0.28
𝐵
𝜎𝑚
= 0.00028
𝐺
𝜎𝑚 = 0.00028
𝜎𝑒𝐵 = 0.0014
𝜎𝑒𝐺 = 0.0014
𝐵
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚
= 198,526.
𝐺
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚 = 198,526.4
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐵 = 296,421.3
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝐺 = 296,421.3
𝐵
𝑘𝑠𝑒
= 380
𝐺
𝑘𝑠𝑒 = 380
𝑐𝑎𝑟 = 3.67
𝛿11 = 0
𝛿12 = 0
𝛿13 = 0
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Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Greenland firms to matter depletion
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Greenland firms to energy depletion
Init. val. of sensitivity of capital depreciation rate of Greenland firms to climate change
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Brownland workers to matter depletion
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Brownland workers to energy depletion
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Brownland workers to climate change
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Greenland workers to matter depletion
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Greenland workers to energy depletion
Init. val. of sensitivity of propensity to consume of Greenland workers to climate change
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Brownland, conventional capital
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Greenland, conventional capital
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Brownland, green capital
Share of renewable energy to total energy in Greenland, green capital
Starting values of exogenous variables for the two open economies
Government green spending in Brownland
Government green spending in Greenland
Government conventional spending in Brownland
Government conventional spending in Greenland
Growth rate of government conventional spending in Brownland up until 2020
Growth rate of government conventional spending in Brownland up until 2020
Return rate on government bonds in Brownland
Return rate on government bonds in Greenland
Interest rate on loans in Brownland
Interest rate on loans in Greenland
Starting values for endogenous variables with lag for the two open economies
Exchange rate
Return rate on equity & shares in Brownland
Return rate on equity & shares in Greenland

𝛿21 = 0
𝛿22 = 0
𝛿23 = 0
𝛼11 = 0
𝛼12 = 0
𝛼13 = 0
𝛼21 = 0
𝛼22 = 0
𝛼23 = 0
𝐵
𝜂𝑐𝑜𝑛
=0
𝐺
𝜂𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0.05
𝐵
𝜂𝑔𝑟
= 0.075
𝐺
𝜂𝑔𝑟
= 0.15

𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟𝐵 = 1

0.05

1.1

𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑔𝑟𝐺 = 1
𝐵
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛
= 0.25
𝐺
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0.25
𝐵
𝑔𝐺𝑂𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛
= 0.0495
𝐺
𝑔𝐺𝑂𝑉,𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 0.0495
𝑟𝐵 = 0.03
𝑟𝐺 = 0.03
𝑟𝑙𝐵 = 0.03
𝑟𝑙𝐺 = 0.03

𝑥𝑟𝐵 = 𝑥𝑟𝐺 = 1
𝑟𝑒𝐺 = 0.03
𝑟𝑒𝐵 = 0.03

Notes: narrowly-defined economic and financial parameters of each area are taken from SFC modelling literature or calibrated to obtain a realistic baseline. Ecological coefficients are based on Dafermos et al.
(2017, 2018) and IPCC (2018). Simulations are run beginning from 1952. Starting values of financial stocks and all remaining lagged endogenous variables are set to zero.
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